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 Abstract . 
How do political parties work on the inside? Which factors determine their policies? What is the place                                 
of the electorate in the functioning of parties? In the past two decades, the search for the answers to                                     
these questions have spurred a number of important contributions to the game theoretical literature on                             
political parties that examined party politics either at the level of individual politicians and voters, or as                                 
a process involving factions ­ the intra­party groups of like­minded party members. This thesis attempts                             
to expose the internal policy­setting mechanism of political parties by reconciling the logic of the two                               
approaches. A formal model is introduced to describe how the two factions of a governing party decide                                 
on its official policy point in a one­dimensional policy space, and how their choice is assessed by the                                   
individual voters, whose policy preferences coincide with those of either of the factions. The                           
theoretical predictions derived from the analysis of the model are evaluated with a laboratory                           
experiment. The findings from the statistical evaluation of the experimental results confirm that the                           
policy change that leads to the re­election of the party occurs in a fragile equilibrium characterised by a                                   
positive policy distance difference between the ideal points of the factions and voters, who see the                               
electoral uncertainty as less important than the policy motivation. A negative policy distance difference                           
tends to result in the re­election of the incumbent party on its current policy preserved by the factions.                                   
Still, the greater presence of imperfect information significantly increases incentives for a policy                         
change and induces voter defection to the opposition if the current policy is retained, as shown by the                                   
theory and the experimental analysis. In general, this study places voters at the heart of intra­party                               
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Table 8. Winning party and leader’s decision means difference Welch’s t­test by treatment order and                             
combination. 72 



















“I think politics is a team sport, and we                 
came together as a team. I think we’ve               















Different opinions and political positions can exist inside any political party. Disagreements are found                           
within even the tiniest groups of people: household members constantly fight over mundane issue such                             
as which sort of bread to buy for supper; tenants’ committee members argue about what share of the                                   
budget to allocate for ordering snacks and drinks for everybody to enjoy at the movie night organised at                                   
the common room; coworkers quarrel over the question of whose turn is it to load the dishwasher with                                   
dirty coffee mugs this Wednesday. Political parties normally attract large enough groups of supporters                           
who join their ranks for a variety of reasons, ideological and sometimes purely material. Naturally,                             
such a complex and large collective formation as a political party can also be affected by the problems                                   
of  a  similar  kind.  
 
This intuition has clearly been taking root in the literature on political parties: the recent scholarship                               
has been increasingly keen on embracing the notion of a political party as a heterogenous collective                               
entity as a starting point for developing theories of party system change and coalition formation                             
(Giannetti and Benoit 2008; Mershon and Shvetsova 2013). However, only a limited number of authors                             
have examined the collective dynamics of intra­party bargaining (Boucek 2009; Ceron 2012). If the                           
party operates in the institutional environment of intra­party democracy, it is reasonable to expect that                             
disagreements are unlikely to be suppressed with the iron fist of a dictatorial leader. Hence, every party                                 
member’s desire should be not only to resolve the conflict by setting the official party policy that gives                                   
the party the best shot at achieving electoral success, but also for their own preferred policy to be the                                     
one that is acknowledged as the common party policy by all of the party’s members. In a party founded                                     
on the principle of internal democracy one member’s interest is unlikely to have a significant influence                               
on the totality of the party’s organisation ­ unless it is supported by a sufficiently numerous contingent                                 
of like­minded members, which in this thesis I refer to as ‘factions’. In this thesis, I argue that political                                     
parties, even those which are famous for their exceptional internal cohesion and strict party discipline,                             
can at times fall prey to vicious internal infighting. Moreover, the likely instigators of conflict are                               
precisely the internal factions of the party organised to promote such policy positions that are accepted                               




 Just as the existing theories of factionalised parties have tended to set voters aside and focus solely on                                   
factions (Boucek 2012; Ceron 2012), the research on party system change and coalitions that                           
understands parties as fragmented organisations has modelled intra­party politics through the lense of                         
individual legislators and voters and not their collective coordination (Giannetti and Benoit 2008;                         
Mershon and Shvetsova 2013; Schofield 2007). The analysis in this study combines the two approaches                             
and refines their logic by showing that the establishment of factions and the ensuing factionalist                             
struggle are not motivated solely by policy­related disagreements of the party members, and that                           
factions are subjected to considerable pressure from the party’s electorate. It is the voters who are                               
selecting their preferred alternative to govern the country on the polling day, and they will certainly be                                 
casting their votes with the goal of helping the party whose policy tops their ranking of alternatives into                                   
government. A policy that fails to provoke the sympathy of the majority of voters is unlikely to bring                                   
victory to the party, and the decision­making attitudes of factions must be affected by this                             
consideration. Electoral defeat is the obvious negative externality that damages a party that promotes                           
unpopular policies and is bound to deprive its factions of the opportunity to influence governmental                             
policy­making. Conversely, the factions may cooperate to choose the correct official policy that should                           
help their party win over the hearts of the masses and keep them at the helm of the power (Boucek                                       
2009) ­ a positive externality of factionalism that is less likely to appear in authoritarian parties that                                 
restrict internal discussions and disregard the wishes of the public. My thesis is an attempt to                               
demonstrate how and in what circumstances the internal policy decisions are made and why party                             
members can either end up lamenting their party’s ill fate or find themselves dancing gleefully to the                                 
upbeat music at an election night celebration party, surrounded by bundles of brightly coloured                           
balloons. 
 
The problem of factionalism. Political parties respond to factionalist conflict in a variety of ways.                             
Sometimes factions break away from their parent party which they believe can no longer be influenced                               
from inside and should be challenged externally. This emerged as the strategy chosen by some of the                                 
members of the Hellenic Parliament for the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) in the aftermath of                                 
the Greek bailout agreement negotiations and the ensuing referendum. The leader of the newly founded                             
party,  Panagiotis  Lafazanis,  announced  the  creation  of  Popular  Unity  by  stating  that  
A new power is coming to the fore. We aim for government ... and we will not fall victim to blackmail.                                         
We  want  to  become  a  great  movement  that  will  sweep  the  bailouts  aside.  (Henley  and  Traynor  2015). 
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 It became clear shortly afterwards that the core reason that led him to declare to be behind the move to                                       
break away from SYRIZA was the irresolvable policy­related disagreement between the wing of the                           
party affiliated with Lafazanis and the its leader, Alexis Tsipras, concerning the principal approach to                             
dealing with the country’s economic woes. Severing ties with the parent party and founding a new one                                 
can turn out to be a risky decision and lead the disgruntled rebels to lose even the minor influence on                                       
policy making they possessed before ­ which is exactly the outcome faced by Lafazanis and his                               
breakaway  party  in  the  aftermath  of  the  2015  Greek  legislative  election  (Nardelli  2015). 
 
It is desirable that a turbulent ‘exit’ (a term used by Albert Hirschman in his seminal study of the                                     
collective action problems in organisations, “Exit, voice and loyalty” (1970), to describe the last­resort                           
strategic response of the disaffected and powerless members to punish the organisation by resigning                           
from it) of the indignant faction members is prevented before it occurs. Party cohesion, the ability of                                 
the party’s members to contribute to its stated goals in a unified and coordinated fashion, is crucial to                                   
the very survival of the party, as a cohesive party’s chances to persist in winning elections and maintain                                   
a working majority in the legislature are greater than that of a divided one (Bowler, Farrell and Katz,                                   
1999). That is why parties often put mechanisms of internal conflict resolution in place. In the autumn                                 
of 2016 Pedro Sánchez, the then­general secretary of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE)                           
attempted to reassert his and his supporters’ crumbling position of dominance in the party and firmly                               
commit the PSOE to voting against the reinstatement of the centre­right Popular Party government led                             
by the Prime Minister, Mariano Rajoy. Sánchez intended to initiate and win an early leadership election                               
by calling for a vote of his party’s federal committee in order to formally approve this measure. He                                   
subsequently was forced to resigned from his position after a heated standoff between his allies and                               
opponents resulted in the victory of the rival faction. In this case, the party succeeded in quelling its                                   
divisive internal conflict through the existing procedures of internal party democracy: neither Sánchez,                         
nor the members of his faction of the party resigned their membership of the PSOE ­ instead they,                                   
albeit begrudgingly, conceded defeat (Buck 2016). Interestingly, the internal strife of such magnitude                         
that the PSOE has been experiencing lately differs enormously from its prolonged success in                           
government in 1982­1997 and in the period from 2004 to 2011, during which the party’s internal                               
disagreements, often concerning the issue of dealing with demands for a greater degree of regional                             




One of the darkest examples of potentially hurtful party infighting is perhaps the case of the Australian                                 
Labor Party (ALP) government, in office from 2007 to 2013. When the institutions such as the ones                                 
that the PSOE in Spain has developed are not perceived to be working sufficiently well, party members                                 
can agree to reform them. This is precisely what happened when the new majority coalition of                               
members of the ALP reinstalled Kevin Rudd as the party leader in the summer of 2013. Rudd, wishing                                   
to stabilise the position of whoever holds the office of the party leader, pushed through a set of new                                     
party rules regulating the conduct of leadership elections. An election from then on could only be                               
initiated with the approval of a qualified majority of the party’s parliamentary caucus members, while                             
the winning candidate would have to secure the majority of the combined and equally weighted vote of                                 
the caucus and rank­and­file party members. Previously, the rules allowed caucus members to call such                             
a vote at a moment of their choosing ­ making first Rudd himself the victim of a sudden palace coup                                       
d'état in 2010 and then allowing him to return to power by deposing Julia Gillard in a similarly                                   
unexpected party room election in 2013 (Bourke 2015). “The Killing Season”, a documentary on the                             
events of the Rudd and Gillard years, has a quote by a former senior advisor to Tony Blair, Alan                                     
Milburn, which brings to light the utter disastrousness of the situation the party was in at the end of its                                       
term  in  government: 
‘The hard question that the Australian Labor Party has to ask itself is this: how is possible that you win                                       
an election in November 2007 on the scale that you do, with the goodwill that you have, with the                                     
permission that you’re gifted by the public and you manage to lose all that goodwill, to trash the                                   
permission and to find yourself out of office within just six years? I’ve never seen anything quite like it                                     
in any country, anywhere, anytime, in any part of the world. No­one can escape blame for that, in my                                     
view’  (Ferguson  2015). 
In stark contrast to the drama of the leadership conflict in the ALP, the example of the changes in the                                       
immigration policy of the party during its six years in power underscores a high degree of internal                                 
cohesion. The policy shift in the ALP on the issue happened when the Kevin Rudd ministry adopted its                                   
‘stop the boats’ policy, which imposed severe restrictions on foreign citizens coming by sea to seek                               
asylum in Australia by making it virtually impossible for them to settle in the country, on July 19, 2013                                     
as the official position of the party and the Australian government. Astonishingly, the concrete move to                               
toughen the policy itself was touted by Julia Gillard as early as in 2010 when she ascended to the                                     
prime­ministership, but it apparently took the party a three­year internal discussion and a major                           
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 migration crisis to unanimously abandon a more lenient stance on immigration while maintaining                         
internal  peace  with  regard  to  policy­setting  (Davidson  2016). 
 
I selected these examples since they pertain to the realities of political life and are indicative of how                                   
complex the problem of intra­party conflicts is and representative of the broad array of means, by                               
which parties tackle it. The main caveat is that these cases, however illustrative, do not provide a clear                                   
insight into the root causes of these drastic outcomes. They merely depict the alternative institutional                             
designs and strategies that can be used to alleviate the symptoms of factionalist discontent in the most                                 
drastic and volatile circumstances, while largely overshadowing the policy­related debates during the                       
longer periods of relative internal stability. It is thus very hard to describe exactly what happens inside                                 
a political party and how the outcomes of these processes are produced without examining the patterns                               
of intra­party behaviour that allows the parties such as the ALP and the PSOE to consistently win                                 
elections and form governments. To answer the practical question of how a political party can escape                               
implosion and nurture a high level of internal cohesion, emphasis should be placed on investigating the                               
course  of  intra­party  bargaining  through  the  rigorous  modelling  of  its  features  and  expected  results. 
 
The aims of the study and the research questions . The purpose of the intended study is to explore                                   
and explain the relationship between intra­party decision­making process and voter response to it. The                           
primary aims of the study are 1) to formulate a theoretical account of this relationship and 2) to evince                                     
theoretical as well as empirical predictions about its outcomes. The two pillars of this research project                               
are the game theoretical model, which fuses the process of intra­party bargaining with the behaviour of                               
voters with a goal of clarifying the links between the two and the implications of such, and the                                   
laboratory experiment that evaluates the predictions obtained from the model. The fundamental                       
research  question  that  this  model  aims  to  answer  is  given  below: 
1. Does a relationship exist between the intra­party policy­setting bargaining of                     




2b. What are the key determinants of the outcomes of this relationship and how does                             
their  influence  manifest  itself? 
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 The question  1 is answered by dissecting the problem at hand with the specifically designed theoretical                               
instrument ­ a formal model. Simultaneously, the process of designing such an instrument produces a                             
key to the question  2a by interpreting the inner workings of the relationship being described with a                                 
focus on the policy preferences of the actors and the electoral uncertainty. Inferences regarding the                             
question  2b naturally follow from the findings that the model yields. The testable hypotheses are then                               
formulated on the basis of the theory and subjected to an experimental evaluation. The completion of                               
the analysis will make a significant contribution to the theory of political parties and the theory of                                 
voting behaviour and provide a valuable theoretical commentary to a number of phenomena affecting                           
modern  two­party  democracies. 
 
The roadmap of the study . I begin with Chapter 1 that sets the stage by offering a comprehensive                                   
review of the literature in political science that touches upon the theory behind intra­party bargaining,                             
the concept of a faction, voting behaviour and the empirical evidence thereof. Chapter 2 takes on the                                 
essential methodological tools utilised in the course of this thesis. The game theoretical model of                             
factionalism and voter response is introduced and discussed in detail in the Chapter 3. The findings                               
from the laboratory experiment are scrutinised and interpreted in the Chapter 4. The thesis wraps up                               








Political parties have for a long time been the primary subject of study for several methodological and                                 
theoretical currents in political science (Aldrich 1995; Dalton and Wattenberg 2002; Duverger 1954;                         
Downs 1957; Katz 2011; Key 1964; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Mair 1997; Riker 1962;                           
Schlesinger 1984; Schofield 2007), and intra­party politics has been featured as an auxiliary topic of                             
varying prominence in the literature on political parties for several decades. Multiple studies of                           
electoral competition and legislative politics exist, where the political party serves as the basic unit of                               
analysis and is viewed as a unitary entity (Axelrod 1970; Laver and Schofield 1998; Powell 2000).                               
However, as has been noted by many students of political parties in the course of the past several                                   
decades, this assumption profoundly disregards the part that intra­party phenomena play in shaping the                           
agency of a party (Bowler, Farrell and Katz 1999; Druckman 1996; Giannetti and Benoit 2008; Laver                               
and Shepsle 1996; Laver 1999; Laver and Benoit 2003; Strøm 1994). In this section I conduct a                                 
comprehensive review of those theoretical and empirical contributions to the study of political parties                           
that made the strongest impact on the development of understanding of mechanisms which characterise                           
the  internal  lives  of  political  parties  in  the  field. 
The ability of individual politicians and party members to alter the course of action of a party is often                                     
argued to be perhaps the most crucial trait that every political party possesses (Riker 1990; Shepsle                               
2006; Tsebelis 1990; Weingast 1996). As follows from this rationale, strategic behaviour of rational                           
and selfish individuals hoping to maximise utility of their actions in keeping with their personalised list                               
of ranked preferences has been emphasized broadly in the scholarship on political parties (McCubbins                           
and Thies 1996). Individual and independent actors form the hierarchy of a political party as                             
rank­and­file party members and officials motivated by desire to win elections, hold political offices                           
and implement their preferred policies (Schlesinger 1975; Strøm 1990). It has been demonstrated that                           
party members select party leadership from among themselves and modify its composition (Heller                         
2013; Schofield and Sened 2002). Evidence exists that political parties field candidates in the elections                             
to legislative bodies, who, if successful, become party­affiliated office holders (Aldrich and Bianco                         
1992). Activists responsible for the efficient functioning of the party’s electoral machine have been                           
shown to be capable of forcing party officials to comply with their ideological demands (Miller and                               
Schofield 2003; Schofield and Sened 2005). The general tendency in the studies of multiparty political                             
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 competition emerged along the lines of these insights to describe the explanatory framework, where                           
political parties are understood to be organised and function through strategic interaction of individuals                           
and under heterogenous and country­specific institutional constraints such as electoral laws and                       1
legislative procedures (Bowler, Farrell and Katz 1999; Cox and McCubbins 2005; Cox and McCubbins                           
2007; Heller and Mershon 2009; König, Tsebelis and Debus 2010; Laver 1999; Laver and Schofield                             
1998; Laver and Shepsle 1996; Mershon 2001; Mershon and Shvetsova 2013; Schofield and Sened                           
2006; Schofield 2007; Thies 2001; Tsebelis 2002). Parties are described as internally divided                         
non­unitary entities ­ coalitions of individual politicians formed to pursue common goals of attaining                           
public offices through the process of nominating candidates and ensuring their electoral success (Heller                           
and  Mershon  2009;  Mershon  and  Shvetsova  2013;  Schofield  and  Sened  2006;  Taylor  et  al.  2014). 
While there appears to be a growing consensus towards the notion of political parties as non­unitary                               
entities (Giannetti and Benoit 2008), certain divergence in exactly how various accounts conceive of                           
intra­party life lingers on. Schofield and Sened (2006) and Schofield (2007) underscore the centrality                           
of ‘valence’, a measure of popularity and electoral strength of the party, its leadership and candidates                               
based on perceptions of the voters and empirically confirmed to originate exogenously through                         
determination by external forces and endogenously by virtue of the internal collaboration of activist                           
groups supporting the party (Schofield and Sened 2006, 16). The electoral methods of seat allocation                             
are emphasized. With regard to electoral systems where plurality rule is used Schofield and Sened point                               
out  that: 
...coalition formation principally takes place inside the party rather than outside (Schofield and Sened                           
2006,  206). 
This mainly implies that discrepancy in policy positions occurs within the party and to a large degree                                 
involves interaction of party officials and the activist base, where the party seeks to obtain campaign                               
resources and activists to influence the policy of the party (Aldrich and McGinnis 1989). Schofield and                               
Sened (2006) contend that activist politics may exist in systems with proportional representation, which                           
they illustrate with the case of the Netherlands. Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that in situations                                 
where internal politics has such a strong bearing on the party’s existence, it is the policies proposed,                                 
1 This study subscribes to the commonly accepted in political science definition of institutions as ‘formal or informal                                   
procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy’                               
(Hall  and  Taylor  1996,  6;  Ostrom  2015;  Riker  1990;  Shepsle  1989). 
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 discussed and adopted collectively by the party leadership and membership that voters take into                           
account  when  making  their  decision  at  the  polling  booth. 
If according to Schofield and Sened (2006) politicians regard the game of setting policy preferences as                               
a vehicle for electoral success, Tsebelis (2002) places policy at the core of his interpretation of every                                 
coalition­building  exercise: 
...all the actors in a political system whether they are voters, representatives, or political parties care                               
about policy outcomes either directly or indirectly ­ either because they have preferences over                           
outcomes or because other things they like (like reelection) depend on policy outcomes (Tsebelis 2002,                             
33).  
Politicians and voters then should have well­defined and comparable policy preferences, as otherwise                         
political parties would not be able to communicate their policy message to the members of the                               
electorate and compete for their votes. In other words, policy preferences can be positioned as ideal                               
points of the actors on a policy scale of at least one dimension ­ which is something that Tsebelis and                                       
Schofield  use  extensively  in  their  spatial  models  of  party  politics  (Schofield  2007;  Tsebelis  2002). 
 
Collective and individual elements of intra­party politics have been at the forefront of empirical and                             
theoretical research in political parties. In addition to the production of theoretical models of inter­party                             
competition and legislative politics, internal divisions in political parties have been brought to light in                             
the examination of a multitude of collective institutions on intra­party decision­making. Institutional                       
phenomena such as the role that distribution of offices in legislative committees and appointment of                             
junior cabinet ministers play in coalition formation process (André, Depauw and Martin 2016; Carroll                           
and Cox 2007; Heller and Mershon 2008; Thies 2001) and the impact of bicameralism and regional                               
autonomy on policy positions inside political parties (Heller 2001, 2002; VanDusky­Allen and Heller                         
2014) have received and continue to attract a great deal of attention. This long­standing focus on                               
legislative politics in all diversity of its institutional devices gave birth to the theoretical and empirical                               
study of legislative party switching where individual legislators, and not political parties, are shown to                             





It is safe to observe that an overall convergence on the validity of the proposition that political parties                                   
are non­unitary, fragile groupings susceptible to external shocks and internal struggles exists in the                           
field. I elaborate on this conclusion by conducting a review of recent literature which, in a significant                                 
departure from the established theory, deals exclusively with the patterns and strategic aspects of                           
collective  intra­party  bargaining.  
 
Political scientists started pondering various ways of defining a faction already several decades ago                           
(Ceron  2012).  Zariski’s  description  of  a  faction  may  be  seen  as  one  of  the  most  general  ones: 
we might define a faction as any intra­party combination, clique, or grouping whose members share a                               
sense of common identity and common purpose and are organized to act collectively­as a distinct bloc                               
within  the  party­  to  achieve  their  goals  (1960,  33). 
Other definitions have been suggested on the basis of possessing distinct goals (Sartori 1976), having                             
own leadership (Janda 1993; Nicholas 1965) or having organised structure and being institutionalised                         
(Boucek 2009; Rose 1964). Factions can be identified within parties in many countries. If factions are                               
able to make an impact on their party’s policy, their interaction should somehow affect the party’s                               
electoral support. If a faction is strong enough to force a modification of a party’s official policy, and                                   
such a course of action becomes its principal aim, it is likely to use its strength to achieve it. As Zariski                                         
notes,  the  goals  of  a  faction: 
… may include any, several, or all of the following: patronage (control of party and government office                                 
by members of the faction), the fulfilment of local, regional, or group interests, influence on party                               
strategy, influence on party and governmental policy, and the promotion of a discrete set of values to                                 
which  members  of  the  faction  subscribe  (1960,  33). 
To put it simply, politicians organise themselves into factions at various levels within their respective                             
political parties in order to promote distinct policy agendas in a coordinated and coherent fashion                             
while continuing to claim public adherence to the official policy advocated by the party as a whole. Just                                   
as many all­encompassing formal theories have originated through empirical investigations of                     
particular institutional arrangements (Cox and McCubbins 2007; Laver 1999; Filippov, Ordeshook and                       
Shvetsova 2004), the study of factions appears to have arised in country­specific contexts. Factionalism                           
in political systems of such countries as Italy, Australia and Japan has been historically viewed as a                                 
prominent phenomenon which is discussed publicly and sometimes formalised in organisational                     
regulations of political parties, all of which encouraged researchers with a corresponding regional focus                           
18 
 to carry out their analyses with a formal theoretical concept of factionalism in mind. Factionalism in                               
the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP) (Cox and Rosenbluth 1996; Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies                             
1999, 2000; Giannetti and Grofman 2011; Kato 1998; Kohno 1992, 1997; Leiserson 1968; Ono 2012),                             
intra­party politics of Christian Democracy and other parties in Italy (Giannetti and Laver 2005;                           
Giannetti and Grofman 2011; Kato and Mershon 2006; Sartori 1976; Zariski 1965), the internal                           
divisions of Australian parties (McAllister 1991; Mulé 2002) and factions of Uruguayan parties                         
(Magar and Moraes 2012; Moraes 2008; Morgenstern 2001) have all been in the focus of formal game                                 
theoretic and quantitative empirical work. This comparativist perspective is strongly linked to the                         
institutional study of cabinet formation process, candidate selection mechanisms, regionalism and                     
federalism, plurality and proportional representation­based electoral systems, and legislative politics in                     
presidential  and  parliamentary  democracies. 
 
Whereas the case­focused approach undoubtedly dominates the research on factions, it is worth                         
discussing those scholars who chose to centre their efforts to formally model intra­party politics on the                               
concept of faction (Boucek 2002, 2009, 2012; Ceron 2012, 2014, 2015, 2016). Ceron (2012), inspired                             
by the strategic framework established by Hirschman (1970) to facilitate analysis of endogenous                         
organised entities, describes a game­theoretic model of interaction taking place between the leader of                           
the party (and its majority faction) and the minority faction. The remarkable novelty of this analysis is                                 
the use of a faction as the unit of analysis (Ceron 2012, 33). The game is an elegant ultimatum                                     
bargaining game for policy and office benefits where the homogenous (that is, united and indivisible                             
entities, all members of which espouse the same policy preferences) majority and minority factions can                             
choose to compromise, accept the proposal or break away from the party, all of which are costly                                 
strategies. It is assumed that the actors are perfectly aware of everything that is happening inside the                                 
party. That is, there is no uncertainty regarding strategies and outcomes of the bargaining game.                             
Boucek (2012) takes a different approach by distinguishing between factions organised formally and                         
disorganised factions. She argues that the use of game theory is most appropriate to conceive of the                                 
latter, as individual decision­making of factional members not grouped together in voting blocks                         
predominantly governs the logic of factionist interaction (2012 48, 49). This conclusion leads Boucek                           




 Despite the differences in focus and methodology, the whole body of literature on factionist interaction                             
is united by the core logic that can be expressed as the following. If all politicians care about policy and                                       
not only about the goals of attaining office and vote maximisation (Schlesinger 1975; Strøm 1990;                             
Müller and Strøm 1999), it is then logical to assume that party members, be they incumbent                               
office­holders or rank­and­file activists, will be inclined to defend their personal policy positions                         
should internal disagreements arise ­ a non­controversial assumption advocated by Strøm (1990) and                         
Mershon and Shvetsova (2013, 33) among others. Then, a proposition that individual party members                           
and legislators need to be organised to exercise leverage inside their political party rationally follows                             
and has been demonstrated as true (Bäck, Debus, and Müller 2011). They may do so by grouping into                                   
factions around a more narrowly defined version of the party’s platform (Debus and Bräuninger 2009).                             
If the previous literature successfully applied the concept of the core to describe the majority policy                               
consensus in the legislature and electoral field among parties (Aldrich 1995; Mershon and Shvetsova                           
2014; Schofield 2007; Tsebelis 2002), then it can also be that individual legislators (and ordinary                             
members) belonging to the same political party may unite in two or more such subgroups (factions) to                                 
promote differing policies inside the same party. Most of the research on factions concentrates almost                             
exclusively on modelling and measuring the impact of specific institutional arrangements on intra­party                         
organisation, while Ceron’s (2012) and Boucek’s (2012) efforts represent perhaps the only extensive                         




Many authors contend that electoral institutions and political parties should be studied jointly, since the                             
influence that the rules of electoral competition have on the internal structure of parties makes them                               
closely interrelated subjects of inquiry (Cox 1997). It goes without saying that voters, the ordinary                             
members of the general electorate, have an immense part to play in affecting the outcomes of elections                                 
regardless of the particular type of electoral system. As parties are understood as key agents of electoral                                 
competition (Taylor et al. 2014), the existence of a connection between intra­party politics and voting                             




 It might come as no surprise to somebody even superficially familiar with the literature on the subject                                 
of voting behaviour that the accumulation of theoretical and empirical knowledge related to it has a                               
long and rich history. The first major contributions to the theory of voting behaviour were made by                                 
Kenneth Arrow (1951) and Anthony Downs (1957), resulting in the advent of rational choice and                             
economically minded discourse on voting in political science (Riker and Ordeshook 1973; McCubbins                         
and Thies 1996). Arrow’s ‘impossibility theorem’ (1951) essentially named the conditions needed to be                           
met for a voting system to facilitate complete transition of all voter’s preferences into a society­wide                               
preference ranking when the number of alternatives is no less than three, while Downs’s ‘paradox of                               
voting’ (1957) stated that costs of voting for a rational, self­interested voter should always exceed the                               2
benefits. These theses informed and directed much of the research conducted on voting in the next                               
several decades (Hinich and Munger 1997). The stark dissonance between the Downsian logic of                           
voting and the reality where individuals do actually vote in elections made discussion of rationality and                               
calculus of voting one of the major foci in the literature, producing diverging accounts of the                               
composition of individual voter’s utility of voting and rules of their behaviour with economic                           
undertones and emphasis (Aldrich 1993; Blais 2000; Bäck, Teorell and Westholm 2011; Feddersen                         
2004; Ferejohn and Fiorina 1974; Fiorina 1981; Grofman 1993; Linhart 2009; Morton 1991; Riker and                             
Ordeshook 1968; Sigelman and Berry 1982; Ordeshook and Zeng 1997; Palfrey and Rosenthal 1983;                           
Panagopoulos 2008; Taylor and Yildirim 2010). A separate, independently conceived notion of                       
strategic voting implying a more sophisticated and less strictly mathematical optimisation of own                         
benefit by individual voters driven by their social upbringing and psychological traits emerged in                           
Duverger’s (1954) seminal study of political parties and gradually came to have a significant bearing                             
on the way of thinking that students of voting behaviour deployed (Beck et al. 2002; Campbell et al.                                   
1960; Darmofal 2010; Druckman 2004; Druckman and Lupia 2006; Funk 1999; Gerber and Rogers                           
2009; Kuklinski et al. 1991; Lewis­Beck 2008; Miller and Shanks 1996; Redlawsk 2004; Sokhey and                             
McClurg 2012). Rational choice and social cognitive schools principally differ on the question of                           
information aggregation by voters. The former sets about solving this problem by bringing the concept                             
of information uncertainty into play and assuming that rational voters will seek to acquire information                             
(Clough 2007; Matsusaka 1995; Ordeshook and Palfrey 1988; Shepsle 1972). A classic example of                           
2 A rational voter is the one that always has a transitive preference ranking of alternatives from worst to best and will always                                             
be able select the same best alternative of the same set on offer by adhering to such ranking and regardless of any irrelevant                                             
alternatives  not  included  in  the  ranking  (Arrow  1951;  Downs  1957;  Hastie  and  Dawes  2010;  Lau  and  Redlawsk  2006). 
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 rational­choice approach to modelling voting behaviour with uncertainty is Cox’s (1987)                     
three­candidate plurality elections model where voters lack certainty with respect to each other’s                         
preference ranking. The latter goes about the issue by assuming minimal information needs for voters                             
concerned above all about their preferred candidates as dictated by their social and psychological                           
instincts and rejecting the idea of information acquisition by voters (Sears et al. 1980; Sears and Funk                                 
1991). A third perspective, cognizant of recent advances in behavioural science and experimental                         
psychology and founded on evidence from surveys and experiments collected over past several                         
decades, allows for limited, or ‘bounded’ rationality (Kahneman 2003; Simon 1991) in voters, whose                           
decision­making is largely intuitive, but who do actively search for moderate quantities of evidence in                             
support of their intuition (Bendor 2010; Lau and Redlawsk 1997; Lau and Redlawsk 2006; Lupia,                             
McCubbins and Popkin 2000; Popkin 1994). The discussion on the cost of voting is particularly                             
important for this study: as the consensus of the large section of the literature has formed around the                                   
idea that voters’ information­gathering and material costs are negated by the utility gained due to                             
abiding by the strong social norm that imposes a civic obligation to cast a vote on them (Aldrich 1993;                                     
Blais 2000; Downs 1957). Most recently, Gerber, Green and Larimer (2008) have presented the                           
evidence  from  a  field  experiment  in  support  of  this  point. 
 
Game theoretical applications in theory of intra­party politics have been generally slow to embrace the                             
advances in voting behaviour research, and there are few instances of such fusion taking place. Usually,                               
when the voters are included in a formal model describing interaction of political parties or intra­party                               
mechanisms, they are depicted as generic Downsian rational individual electors with interest in policy.                           
In Mershon and Shvetsova’s (2013, 38­39) interpretation, voters also pay close attention to the                           
individual incumbent legislator’s party loyalty and to the perceived variance of this legislator’s policy                           
positions. The loyalty is defined through the legislator’s party switching history such that a decrease in                               
its value corresponds to an increase in the incumbent’s changes in party affiliation (Mershon and                             
Shvetsova 2013, 41). Individual voting has also been presented in terms of contributing to the                             
candidate given that the size of such contribution does not exceed the valence of the candidate                               
(endogenously derived from resources deployed by the candidate in the campaign and reliant on                           
exogenous strength of the candidate’s image and policy positions) minus the policy distance from the                             
voter’s ideal point (Schofield and Sened 2006, 188­189). The approach is then to condition a                             
candidate’s strategy on the positions of such activist voters, so as to demonstrate how a compromise                               
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 vote­maximising position is chosen by the candidate to address activist demands of varying essence                           
(Schofield and Sened 2006, 193). In Ceron’s interpretation, which is the only robust game­theoretic                           
examination of intra­party politics putting factions at its heart, voters’ response is inscribed on                           
variables connected to the electoral process, while publicly expressed discontent hurts the image of the                             
party and deters voters (2012, 20, 21, 41). That is, in Ceron’s (2012) model voters are not active                                   
participants of the decision­making process in the game, and the accumulation of votes by parties in                               
elections  is  thus  affected  by  the  outcomes  of  the  intra­party  bargaining  automatically. 
 
There is more than enough room for improvement: just as the faction­based models of intra­party                             
bargaining tend not to have voters in them, advanced theory of intra­party bargaining disregards the                             
notion of factions. A model combining factionist bargaining and voter agency is warranted. Proceeding                           
with the rational­choice set of assumptions about behaviour of consolidated factions (Boucek 2012;                         
Ceron 2012) and individual voters (Downs 1957), I sketch a simple foundation for such a model.                               
Suppose that, if voters indeed care about policy and are willing to support their preferred positions, it is                                   
possible that they may support a party, some of whose office­holding members declared positions                           
directly appealing to them, even if the official party policy is somewhat different from their ideal point.                                 
If parties are non­unitary entities, as argued by Laver and Schofield (1998), Schofield and Sened                             
(2005) and Mershon and Shvetsova (2008, 2013), and voters can at least to some extent be viewed as                                   
rational policy­driven information­seeking utility maximizers (Bendor 2010; Lau and Redlawsk 2006),                     
then from the analysis presented above stems a valuable conclusion: voters may be considering not just                               
to the policy positions of parties or particular candidates, but also the policy positions of the factions of                                   
particular parties. A faction, understood as a collective and homogenous actor trying to influence how                             
their party’s policy is set, must consider whether their position has support of a sufficient number of                                 
their party’s constituents regardless of their size as a proportion of all ordinary and office­holding                             
members of the party. This is necessary for them to actively and confidently promote their chosen                               
policy position and compete on it against opposing factions. At the same time, a rational faction should                                 
strive to preserve the fraction of the party’s voter base needed for it to be able to achieve electoral                                     
victory. Rational and strategic voters should also be willing to take these circumstances into                           
consideration in order to be able to cast their votes for the right candidate and see their preferred policy                                     
implemented (Battaglini, Morton and Palfrey 2010; Fox and Shotts 2009; Greene and Haber 2015).                           
The existing experimental research on the impact of partisan endorsements on voting behaviour (a                           
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 subject widely referred to as ‘party cues’) lends additional weight to this reasoning, as voters have been                                 
found to have strong reactions on issues of importance (Brader and Tucker 2012, 115) and can be                                 
hypothesised to behave similarly when intra­party position taking is considered. In other words and in                             
accord with the rational choice logic of earlier studies, factions and voters must seek to overcome                               




One of the aims stated in the introduction to this study is to lay the groundwork for a versatile and                                       
in­depth empirical evaluation of the theoretical findings presented in Chapter 3 of this study. In this                               
section I acknowledge the progress that has already been achieved, discuss the methodological                         
character of empirical research on factionist politics and identify aspects where novel contribution can                           
be  made  and  suggest  means  of  doing  so. 
 
A common pattern unites all empirical investigations into factionalism. The first step is to select a                               
specific institution or set of institutions related to factional politics or affected by it and examine it as                                   
an explanatory variable (variables) or dependent variable (variables). Most studies cited in section 1.2                           
of this chapter represent in­depth exploration either of the impact of factionalism on a dependent                             
variable of interest (such as influence of the degree of intra­party factional division on portfolio                             
allocation in LDP cabinets in Japan in Ono (2012)) or of the impact of some explanatory variable on                                   
intra­party setting (Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies (1999) conduct analysis of the relationship of electoral                           
system change in Japan on the intra­party organisation and institution­specific strategic behaviour in                         
LDP). With the aim to aggregate, systematise and innovate previous research, Ceron (2012) presents a                             
comprehensive set of theoretical predictions encompassing a broad array of institutional and intra­party                         
variables and empirically tests hypothesised relationships between these to describe factions both as                         
predictors of institutional or behavioural change and its objects. The evaluation of formal models                           
involves solving the problem of operationalisation of key variables employed in such models (Morton                           
1999). In other words, theoretical categories deployed in such formal models need to have a                             
quantifiable counterpart in real­life setting. Ceron (2012), Laver (1999), Schofield and Sened (2006)                         
and other authors directed by their game theoretical analysis aim to construct variables from data on                               
intra­party institutional devices interpreted as causative with respect to the magnitude of change in                           
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 actors’ payoffs. For instance, Ceron approaches measuring party loyalty, one of the key payoff                           
variables in his model, by examining observations describing the age of political parties in his dataset                               
and  registering  change  in  party  symbols  at  party  congresses  (2012,  205). 
 
The next step is to choose a country or a group of countries for the purposes of data collection. The                                       
standard procedure is to target printed sources for subsequent input and analysis with the help of                               
suitable statistical models and techniques (Diermeier and Stevenson 1997; Döring 1995; Mattson and                         
Strøm 1995). The nature of the unit of analysis is such that the task of obtaining quantitative data on                                     
factional behaviour appears to be cumbersome. Delineating factional affiliation among members of                       
same political party is difficult mainly because factions are rarely formalised in a way that is                               
documented and placed in the public domain: their membership composition alters informally and their                           
numbers  change  frequently,  as  stressed  by  Ceron: 
...we should be aware that factions are not fixed as well. Instead they are an endogenous output of the                                     
intra­party environment and the party system. Along this line we retain that it does not make sense to                                   
treat them as stable. Even organized factions in fact might divide and recombine themselves across                             
subsequent  party  congresses  (2012,  23­24)  . 
In certain country­specific contexts characterised by the presence of formally constituted intra­party                       
factions (such as Italy and Japan) it is at times possible to obtain consistent and verifiable data on even                                     
the tiniest items belonging to the realm of daily factionalism, such as indicators of persistent factional                               
allegiance of particular politicians and records of meetings of intra­party bodies (Boucek 2009; Ceron                           
2012; Giannetti and Benoit 2008; Kato and Mershon 2006; Mershon 2001). However, it goes without                             
saying that avenues for conducting survey research on a sample of representatives of factionalised                           
parties in the majority of cases are somewhat limited. Therefore, scholars of factional politics have in                               
the past actively and successfully sought to simplify the task of obtaining data by specifying the level                                 
of party organisation, at which such data might be present in the most transparent, sustainable and                               
accessible state. National and regional legislatures have been practically proven to be the right places                             
where behaviour of politicians, manifested chiefly in parliamentary debates, speeches and voting, is                         
continuously observed and recorded (Bernauer and Bräuninger 2009; Curini and Martelli 2010;                       
Giannetti and Pedrazzani 2016). The records are then released to the general public through the official                               
parliamentary printed sources or press releases to the media. Results of primary elections of official                             
party candidates and elections to intra­party governing bodies, where ideological position­taking is                       
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 practised by contesting politicians, are in some cases documented and publicised to an extent sufficient                             
for the appropriation for scientific use. Political positions can also normally be identified by means of                               
consulting election manifestos, interviews and opinion pieces published by credible media                     
organisations (Budge, Crewe and Farlie 2010; Tresch 2009). Several issues are often encountered                         
while constructing a dataset for analysis in the study of political parties. Coding is one of the most                                   
important of them, as consistency of categories and labels used in production of quantitative datasets is                               
directly affecting the validity and subsequent replicability of findings (Benoit, Laver and Mikhaylov                         
2009; Volkens, Bara and Budge 2009). Locating policy preferences of political actors and ensuring                           
validity of policy position estimates is a challenge that remains at the heart of comparative research on                                 
political parties (Benoit, Bräuninger and Debus 2009; Laver and Garry 2000; Volkens 2007). This is                             
the reason why indices have in the past been introduced to accommodate the need for viable                               
transposition of theoretical concepts onto the data available (Ceron 2012; Dalton 2008; Dalton, Farrell                           
and  McAllister  2011;  Shapley  and  Shubik  1954;  Straffin  1977;  Warwick  1994). 
 
On the contrary, experimental research on intra­party politics occupies an infinitesimally small space in                           
the landscape ruled by statistical applications and rich cross­country or country­specific real­life data                         
(Giannetti and Benoit 2008). Natural experiments with institutional change have been identified and                         
studied, notably for the case of electoral reform in Italy and Japan (Giannetti and Grofman 2011).                               
Laboratory experiments that come closest to the focus on intra­party politics are those centred on the                               
subject of legislative and coalition bargaining (Palfrey 2009). Policy positioning through voting and                         
bargaining in the laboratory with various institutional specifications was examined by Fréchette, Kagel                         
and Morelli (2005), Fréchette, Kagel and Lehrer (2003), Battaglini, Nunnari, and Palfrey (2012),                         
Drouvelis, Montero and Sefton (2010) and Diermeier and Morton (2005), among many others. These                           
experiments were initiated as responses and attempts to test the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) legislative                             
bargaining model and were designed as voting and bargaining games. As laboratory experiments allow                           
researchers to have greater control over their substance and outcomes, wider use of this vehicle of                               





This Chapter contributes to the goal of clearing the field for the discussion of methodology that                               
follows. The logic of the theoretical exploration in the Chapter 3 is informed by the points made in this                                     
Chapter as well. Political science has a strong tradition of quantitative empirical research on the                             
intra­party bargaining, some of which is based on the theoretical analysis structured through the formal                             
models specifically tailored to its needs. The most prominent analyses do indeed have a                           
game­theoretical foundation, which evolves around the primacy of the party leadership and activists                         
(Schofield and Sened 2006) or, alternatively, of the individual legislators and voters (Mershon and                           
Shvetsova 2013) in the intra­party processes. The research that draws on the concept of factionalism to                               
analyse the inner lives of divided parties occupies a certain niche in the discipline and is far from being                                     
ubiquitous: Ceron (2012) and Boucek (2012) are the authors of the key large­scale studies that                             
suggested generalising the intra­party politics by centering their inquiries on factions. The existing                         
empirical studies deal mostly with the observational data on parties and elections, although the                           
model­based experiments on individual voting behaviour of voters and legislators have gained                       
prominence in the past two decades. The core takeaways from this literature review are: first, that the                                 
game­theoretical analysis of factionalism in political parties is appropriate under rational choice                       
assumptions made about homogenous, individual­like factions that are formed by the members of the                           
same party; second, that the present state of the theory of intra­party bargaining could be improved by                                 
bringing policy­motivated homogenous factions and voters together in a formal model of intra­party                         
bargaining with electoral uncertainty, a novel approach that has not to this date been tested in the                                 





The discussion in Chapter 1 demonstrated the urgency of the need to address the gap in the research on                                     
intra­party politics that exists with respect to the collective bargaining aspect of factional interaction.                           
One of the key remaining challenges in structuring the argumentation of the theory of intra­party                             
bargaining that I was able to identify is mainly related to the relationship between internal processes of                                 
a political party and the power to determine its electoral fate that its voter constituency wields. I have                                   
shown that this problem, upon closer examination, reveals a pattern of strategic behaviour on the part                               
of intra­party as well as extraneous actors. Several prominent studies have attempted to model                           
intra­party politics by means of applying game theoretical instruments to carve the strategic                         
decision­making processes from a set of basic assumptions and predict their outcomes in a robust                             
manner. Yet, none of these have succeeded in building an overarching formal theoretical account of                             
intra­party politics which would not only embrace the organised features of internal divisions occurring                           
in parties, but would also incorporate the role that voters have in tailoring the patterns of conflict                                 
between opposing groups of politicians united by their common party affiliation. The present section                           
outlines the methodological cornerstones that such account has to be founded upon, details the core                             
steps one should follow in developing it and deals with the strengths, weaknesses and concerns                             
pertaining  to  formal  modelling  in  political  science. 
 
The analytical framework that I intend to follow in this study is suggested by Jon Elster (2015) in                                   
‘Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences’. To put it simply, Elster                               
insists that any optimal analytical arrangement should be rooted in an established, logically consistent                           
theoretical framework, which should serve as a blueprint for each step of the analysis. The duties of a                                   
theorist do not simply boil down to demonstrating the existence of a causal link between the dependent                                 
variable of the study and the independent variables said to be affecting its state. One has to show such                                     
link can be characterised as a mechanism ­ a ‘frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal                             
pattern that is triggered under generally unknown conditions or with indeterminate consequences’                       
(Elster 2015, 36). The goal that logically follows once the mechanism underlying the relationship in                             
question has been identified is to specify the conditions, under which such a mechanism can evolve.                               
Testable hypotheses should be constructed with theory being the primary reference point for them. In                             
the final stage of the process, the hypotheses are evaluated empirically. This is accomplished by means                               
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 of developing alternative statements and subjecting these, juxtaposed to the originally proposed                       
hypotheses, to vigorous scrutiny. The procedural direction I have just described is widely used in social                               
sciences (Morton 1999) and is referred to as the hypothetico­deductive method (Elster 2015, 17).                           
Reversing this schedule or altering the order of its parts would be considered as ‘cheating’, meaning                               
that  data  analysis  cannot  come  before  the  meticulous  theoretical  understanding  is  devised. 
 
It is always desirable that a theoretical framework is powerful and capable of producing intuitive                             
explanations of studied phenomena. However, even the most appealing and convincing accounts can                         
fall victim to fallacies, internal contradictions and factual inaccuracy. The easiest way to fall into a trap                                 
of logical inconsistency is to frame the theoretical argument of the study as an unsubstantiated narrative                               
by means of utilising implicit assumptions about the reality, in which the object of inquiry is said to                                   
exist. I presume that there is no malice in the motives of a researcher: if there is any, a vigorous peer                                         
review process should prevent fraud being committed by the members of scientific community. Yet                           
even a researcher with her heart in the right place can still quickly lose the train of her thought caught                                       
up in an attempt to construct an informally narrated explanatory model from a verified fact or a                                 
collection of such facts. Morton (1999, 35) points out that this exercise of nonformal modelling,                             
however heuristically suitable for the purposes of initial exploration of the studied phenomenon, cannot                           
suffice as a path to subsequent empirical evaluation. The urgency of the task lying ahead of any scholar                                   
who seeks an in­depth, scrupulous interpretation of the part of the world falling within the scope of                                 
their research endeavour is such that only the finest­tuned instruments can lead them to success.                             
Mershon and Shvetsova (forthcoming, 6) contend that it is the formal models that are logically                             
wholesome thanks to the mathematical laws keeping their elements and intrinsic relationships                       
consistent  that  are  the  best  antidote  to  confusion  and  errors  in  scientific  analysis.  
 
Thus, reaching the aims of this project should involve constructing a formal game­theoretic model of                             
factional behaviour. Such a model has to constitute an abstract and simplified representation of the                             
bargaining process taking place inside a political party to decide on an official policy platform of the                                 
party. It is paramount that the model works on the premises derived from fundamental intuitions                             
regarding the internal processes of a political party in a democratic political system, so that the                               
predictions resulting from it can be operationalised to pave the way for a rigorous empirical assessment                               
(Morton 1999, 55). Achieving my primary aim is made possible by fulfilling certain requirements. First                             
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 and foremost, a step away from the real­world examples of intra­party bargaining situations such as                             
those described in the introduction to this study has to be taken to vacate the space for a set of basic                                         
assumptions  to  be  put  in  place.  As  Morton  puts  it   
A nonformal model becomes a formal model when a researcher expresses the real­world situation in                             
abstract  and  symbolic  terms  in  a  set  of  explicitly  stated  assumptions  (1999,  36). 
The issue of complexity is central to the effort one undertakes to formulate these assumptions. A                               
foundation that is too general is bound to severely impede any attempt at deriving testable results from                                 
the model. An overly simplistic one, while solvable with little difficulty, should greatly limit the                             
predictive power of whatever the findings obtained from the model turn out to be. It is then not                                   
surprising that, in the absence of axiomatic laws that are built into the foundation of theories in natural                                   
sciences, political scientists are left with the stark choice: to tone down the quest for the universality of                                   
their models in favour of piecemeal yet rigorous explanatory approach, or to take selective statements                             
about human behaviour at face value in hope that the resulting analytical product fits the reality well                                 
enough (Elster 2015, 50). Given the absence of already existing simplified formal models of intra­party                             
bargaining, which include individual voters and are based on the concept of factionalism, in this project                               
I will try to occupy the middle ground between these two viewpoints. A foundation that is reliable and                                   
respected while enabling me to set out and build an applied formal model is demanded. I will seek to                                     
adopt the rational­choice assumptions, since they are commonly accepted and widely used in the                           
formal models of political parties (Laver 1999, Schofield and Sened 2006, Ceron 2012, Mershon and                             
Shvetsova 2013). This will be done with a view to devise a formal, logically consistent and empirically                                 




It is a good time to ask several important questions. First, what is rationality? Why should we presume                                   
that the reality, from which the abstractions in our model will be made, is ruled by the laws of                                     
rationality? Are there better substantiated sources, from which assumptions could be borrowed and fed                           
to the model under consideration? This section will discuss the logic of rational choice theoretical                             




 Let us recall the roadmap for this study that was outlined in the introductory part. The primary aim is to                                       
develop a structured and straightforward theoretical model which can be used to shape the main                             
argument and its implications and is suitable for the subsequent translation into the language of                             
empirical research. Clearly, in order to cross this aim off the list I have to seek to attain a sufficient                                       
level of simplicity. This entails constructing a foundation by assuming certain statements to be true and                               
hoping that this is confirmed later on in the empirical section of the study. The key assumption made                                   
about individual behaviour in rational choice game theory is that individuals have and actively cultivate                             
evidence­based beliefs, which help them make informed decisions rationally (Elster 2015, 191). It is                           
intuitively attractive and is in part echoed by the behavioural experimental research into the                           
psychological features of individual decision­making, which demonstrated that information gathering                   
indeed takes place and is facilitated by the use of automatised cognitive heuristics embedded in the                               
mind of an average human being (Anderson et al 2004; Kahneman 2003; Simon 1991). There are of                                   3
course additional limits that can be imposed on the information acquisition by a rational individual                             
voter or politician that can be interpreted in terms of direct and opportunity costs of making a decision                                   
(Elster 2015, 214). For the purpose of increasing the intrinsic simplicity and coherence of this analysis                               
disregarding these constraints while modelling the individual choice of actors appears to be both                           
optimal and realistic . Thus, politicians and the members of electorate can be described as rational                             4
information­seekers,  whose  decisions  are  evidence­based.  
 
If the individuals involved in electoral competition have rational beliefs that are translated into                           
informed choices, then what are the outcomes, with which these beliefs are associated? The                           
relationship I aim to analyse is closely tied to the positions that candidates and political parties adopt                                 
with regard to various policy considerations that voters tend to pay attention to. As was mentioned                               
3 The established consensus acknowledges that while ‘people generally want to make good decisions’, they are constrained                                 
by the cognitive limitations of human mind and generally tend to deploy automatised cognitive information processing                               
techniques,  or  heuristics,  to  optimise  their  decision­making  process   (Lau  and  Redlawsk  2006,  25) 
4 It may be argued that higher the price of information on the prospective balance of support for political parties in the                                           
electorate on the polling day and the more difficult it is to obtain an exhaustive account of the policy profile of each                                           
candidate, the smaller the rational individual effort directed at obtaining such information should be. Still, as opinion polling                                   
information is publicly available from a variety of media that voters come in contact with daily, and the information on any                                         
issue of the campaign will normally be attained by voters at little to no cost, helping them reach a decision that is ‘right’ and                                               
‘easy’  at  the  same  time  (Lau  and  Redlawsk  2006,  14). 
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 earlier, rational decision­making in politics must follow from the individual preferences to the policy                           
outcomes of an electoral process that are transitive in the sense of being distinct and ordered from the                                   
worst to the best (Arrow 1951; Elster 2015). The key challenge then is to map the policy preferences of                                     
political actors in a way that allows for them to be subjected to measurement and comparison. The                                 
spatial representation of political competition is a ubiquitous and widely accepted instrument that I will                             
apply in order to resolve this challenge (Downs 1957; Schofield 2007; Tsebelis 1990, 2002). The value                               
of this approach to this study is crystal clear: it allows for the positions of factions and voters                                   
concerning a policy issue to be assigned unique locations ­ ideal or bliss points (Schofield 2007, 126;                                 
Tsebelis 2002, 37) with specific cardinal values on a spatial Euclidean scale. Such an arrangement                             
would belong to a class of proximity spatial models of electoral competition, as the pleasure that actors                                 
derive from the policy that ends up being implemented after the election (i.e. the winning policy point)                                 
is described as a monotonic function of the geometrical distance to it from their ideal policy points                                 
(Merrill 1995) . In other words, the farther the ideal point of an actor is from the policy point of the                                       5
party  or  coalition  that  forms  the  government,  the  smaller  the  utility  gains  are  for  this  actor.  
 
Once the policy preferences of political actors are outlined on a policy space, the analysis of their                                 
decision­making becomes truly possible. Naturally, the pressing methodological concern lying at the                       
very heart of such analysis is related to the concepts that should be incorporated into it. A glance at                                     
several commonly known features of democratic elections should aid in the process of composing an                             
appropriate analytical toolkit and justifying its contents. First, since electoral outcomes are notorious                         
for often being unpredictable or at the very least unstable, the notion of uncertainty immediately comes                               
into play. This inevitably leads me to consider the expected utility theory, a framework that provides                               
the techniques needed to manufacture the basic building blocks of a model with uncertainty ­ the                               
expected utility functions of the actors (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). The theory is known as                               
the dominant approach to dealing with uncertainty and underpins most of the extant formal game                             
theoretical models of politics (Morton 1999, 147). Given that the preference ranking that actors have                             
over their decision­making outcomes remains unaltered regardless of the presence of irrelevant                       
alternatives and the change in probabilities that are assigned to each alternative on the list (that is, when                                   
the preferences over policy outcomes are independent and continuous), a politician or a voter can be                               
5 Rabinowitz and Macdonald (1989) advocate a directional spatial model, where the actors are permitted to hold preferences                                   
over  the  same  policy  issue  that  vary  in  terms  of  intensity.  This  study  takes  advantage  of  the  geometrical  proximity  model. 
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 assumed to have an expected utility over any choice they make (Aliprantis and Chakrabarti 2000, 37;                               
Morton 1999, 148). The expected utility, which in the context of a game is referred to as a ‘payoff’, is                                       
defined as the sum of the utilities of various alternative winning policy points multiplied by the                               
probabilities (that is, the likelihoods) of their occurrence, which is referred to as the addition rule (Dixit                                 
and Skeath 2004, 224) . Reflecting the atmosphere of uncertainty, in which any election is shrouded, a                               6
political actor forms the rational belief about the likelihood of a particular electoral outcome based on                               
the probabilistic evidence they obtain. To put it plainly, the concept of expected utility paves the way                                 




The previous section revealed that rigorous assessment of the individual preferences of the actors in the                               
prospective formal model as well as the expectations that these actors have to the potential outcomes of                                 
their interaction can be made possible through the combined application of spatial modelling and                           
expected utility theory under the assumptions made in rational choice theory. The next step of the                               
process is then to ensure that the theoretical argument regarding the exact patterns of behaviour of                               
factions and voters that is being put forward in the Chapter 3 of this study possesses internal logical                                   
consistency and is compatible with the assumptions it stems from. In this section I discuss in detail the                                   
instruments and guidelines from the noncooperative game theory that I will take advantage of in the                               
process of constructing the model of factional bargaining, emphasise the sequential character of                         
interaction between the political actors and clarify the primary purpose of model building ­ the search                               
for  equilibrium  solutions  to  the  intra­party  bargaining  puzzle. 
 
There can be no doubt that the relationship between intra­party actors and the electorate should be                               
modelled as an extensive form noncooperative game. The term ‘extensive form’ refers to a class of the                                 
game theoretical models of strategic interaction, under which the choices of actors are made                           
sequentially (Aliprantis and Chakrabarti 2000, 115; Dixit and Skeath 2004, 46), ­ an approach that is                               
perfectly suitable to the complex situations in electoral competition where non­unitary parties and                         
6 In keeping with the goal of creating a model that will serve as a starting point for a larger conversation, I make a                                               
simplifying assumption by assigning the actors to have a neutral attitude to risk and a strictly linear utility function                                     
(Aliprantis  and  Chakrabarti  2000,  40). 
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 voters are put in focus. Just as the actors engaged in a game have a ranking of preferences over its                                       
outcomes, they must be plotting the policy space mentally and thinking strategically about their own                             
moves and the moves that their opponents, the other players, might want to make. It is only normal to                                     
expect the faction leaders to be prepared for all alternative situations that can arise from each of the                                   
number of decisions that their colleagues in the party may make. The game of the majority and                                 
minority factions by Ceron (2012, 36) and the party leader­legislator game by Laver (1999, 16), which                               
attribute strictly strategic and sequential logic to the behaviour of factions (politicians), have much in                             
common with my interpretation. At the same time, it is self­evident the internal groups in a political                                 
party who care about leading it to electoral success cannot reasonably allow themselves to put off the                                 
resolution of their disagreements until the polling day or the beginning of early voting period. In a                                 
similar fashion, voters would be taking notice not only of their personal ideological and party                             
sympathies, but also of the institutional constraints (such as the majority rule) that may divert the                               
results of an election in the direction unfavourable to them. This, as well as the fact that the voters’                                     
choice is not officially registered until they have cast their vote, has informed the models of legislative                                 
party switching and party system change by Mershon and Shvetsova (2013, 38) and of the composite                               
political cycle by Schofield and Sened (2006, 7). While any attempt to outline the complete historical                               
sequence of strategic decision­making of individual politicians and voters or their homogenous and                         
individual­like groups would be cumbersome and hardly feasible, a model of a particular frequently                           
repeated interactive situation ­ such as the ones of the intra­party policy setting process and the                               
subsequent electoral test, ­ is a clear­cut possibility and is called a ‘subgame’ in game theoretical                               
terminology (Aliprantis and Chakrabarti 2000, 142). A decision tree, often referred to as a game tree, is                                 
the standard graphical representation of the extensive form game that captures the above­described                         
interaction (Dixit and Skeath 2004, 46). The commencement of a hypothetical interactive situation is                           
marked as a starting point, or the root of the tree, from which the branches divided into a number of                                       
appropriately labelled edges denoting the strategies of actors (players) will spread, separated by a new                             
node each time the need for another player to make their move arises; each sequence of edges ends                                   
with  a  terminal  node  (Dixit  and  Skeath  2004,  46;  Aliprantis  and  Chakrabarti  2000,  91). 
 
The term ‘noncooperative’, introduced in the previous paragraph to describe the variety of a game                             
theoretical model that constitutes the heart and soul of this study, is related to the eponymous subfield                                 
of game theory that examines the origins of collective interaction outcomes by requiring the binding                             
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 mutual agreements between the players to be absent (Gates and Humes 1997, 3). In the case of                                 
homogenous factions and voters, the noncooperative approach imposes a highly restrictive definition of                         
optimality on the cooperative outcomes of the players: the outcome can be optimal only when it is                                 
self­enforceable (Morton 1999, 82). Thus, the main condition that an optimal solution to the                           
noncooperative game of factions and voters has to meet is that neither a faction nor a voter can switch                                     
from their present strategy to a more appealing alternative (Aliprantis and Chakrabarti 2000, 55). What                             
has just been described is in fact the definition of the core concept of noncooperative game theory, the                                   
Nash equilibrium (Nash 1951). In extensive form games, such as the sequential­move game of                           
intra­party decision­making and voter response, the optimal combination of strategies (or the ‘strategy                         
profile’) of the game is defined as the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium ­ that is, the Nash equilibrium                                   
that holds for all subgames of the game (Aliprantis and Chakrabarti 2000, 120, 144). Imagine the case                                 
where the supposed Nash equilibrium is that of the political party winning the election with a reformed                                 
policy on an issue. Yet if one of the factions desires to introduce a policy reform while being aware that                                       
supporting the current party policy on the issue in question carries more weight for it than picking a                                   
fight with the rival faction, it will likely be inclined to avoid making a proposal. Then, the optimality                                   
hypothesis is rejected. As demonstrated by the example, the appeal that the extensive form                           
noncooperative game projects is undeniably powerful, precisely because this method underscores the                       
endogenous mechanism of the cooperation between players (Morton 1999, 83). A modeller can control                           
for the presence of optimal self­enforcing strategic outcomes at each stage of the sequential game by                               
moving from the branches ending with terminal nodes to the root of the decision tree in order to                                   
analytically trace the optimal strategy profiles at all of its stages. Every step of the procedure would                                 
involve drawing comparisons between expected utilities of each player for each pair of possible                           
decisions. This technique is commonly referred to as backward induction and is widely applied to solve                               
the extensive form games for all possible subgame perfect Nash equilibria (Dixit and Skeath 2004, 54).                               
The theoretical results ­ the Nash equilibria with constraints, ­ that are produced through backward                             
induction can then be used to interpret and predict the behaviour of actors in the model as well as serve                                       
as  the  basis  for  the  future  empirical  work. 
 
What about the electoral uncertainty and the levels of public support for various policy alternatives?                             
The concept of imperfect information, represented in the form of information sets in extensive form                             
games, is a convenient device that permits a modeller to successfully tackle this complex issue                             
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 (Aliprantis and Chakrabarti 2000, 122). That is, whenever the faction or voter are understood to have                               
only partial knowledge of the possible outcomes and make their judgements based on the probabilities                             
of such, the decision tree will have an information set surrounding the nodes corresponding to the                               
actors with incomplete information. The nature, included in the model as an independent ‘actor’, is                             




The multifaceted rationale supporting the idea of building a formal model consists of several important                             
goals. The earlier discussion in this chapter focused to a large extent on the paramount advantage and                                 
aim of formal models, which is to reinforce logical consistency of the theoretical argument being made                               
by the modeller by ensuring the linkage between the baseline assumptions made about the relationship                             
under scrutiny and the flow of the argument is finely maintained. This section heralds the second and                                 
equally important reason for developing a formal model, which is to prepare the ground for the applied                                 
empirical extension to the theoretical foundation of this research (Mershon and Shvetsova,                       
forthcoming, 3; Morton 1999, 24). Here, the case for conducting a laboratory experiment to confirm or                               
reject the hypotheses derived from the proposed model of intra­party bargaining, which was suggested                           
first in the Chapter 1, is made. Next, the methodological aspects of running such an experiment are                                 
outlined with references to the research traditions from political science and behavioural economics.                         
The review presented below informs the empirical analysis of the Chapter 4 of this thesis. The ethical                                 
considerations as well as the statistical tools to assess the findings of an experiment are examined in the                                   
Chapter  4.  
 
Experimentation is a unique approach to investigating relationships with the target of justifying causal                           
inference about the phenomena in focus, which has attained a prominent status in political science                             
since the 1970s (Druckman et al 2006; McDermott 2002). Its singularity is made possible thanks to a                                 
distinctive feature that defines the class of experimental methods in social sciences and separates it                             
from observational studies involving human subjects ­ the concept of randomisation, or random                         
assignment into groups within the sample of participants (Druckman et al 2011, 17). Random sampling,                             
a method that implies drawing a sample of individuals from the population at random and thus ensuring                                 
that their probabilities of being included in the sample are equal, is a necessary measure aimed at                                 
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 reducing the selection bias of the participant recruitment: since individuals differ in many respects, it is                               
upon the researcher to prevent an over­concentration of similar individuals by means of monitored                           
random selection (McDermott 2011, 36). Hence, the experimental evaluation in this thesis must first of                             
all seek to be based on a random sample of individual participants. However, a study based on a                                   
random sample does not constitute an experiment, unless the individual subjects are assigned their roles                             
randomly in order to mitigate the presence of cross­group differences in the experiment to the best                               
extent possible (Brader and Tucker 2012, 134; Druckman et al 2011, 17). Without randomisation it is                               
impossible to guarantee the reliability of the average treatment effects discovered (Brader and Tucker                           
2012, 114). By ‘treatment’ political scientists understand the factors that have a potential to influence                             
the  behaviour  of  participants  in  the  study  (Druckman  et  al  2011,  16).  Holt  defines  a  treatment  as  a 
completely specified set of procedures, which includes instructions, incentives, rules of play, etc (2007,                           
18) 
and contends that the best approach to random assignment is to introduce it in the form of a                                   
within­subject design, which entails letting each individual subject experience all treatments that are                         
administered, so that all potential differences within the group of such individuals on the variables of                               
importance can be controlled for by contrasting the experiences of this group between the treatments                             
(Holt 2007, 19). The classical between­subject experimental design would normally include treatment                       
and control groups, where the treatment is administered only to the subjects in the former (Druckman et                                 
al 2011, 3). To enable comparisons, a within­subject random assignment of treatments would simply                           
need to produce a change in the outcome variable for at least two levels of the treatment variable, one                                     
of which would serve as the baseline (Holt 2007, 18). The aim of the experiment, defined in the                                   
Neyman­Rubin causal inference model (Neyman (1923) 1990; Rubin 1974), is to allow the researcher                           
to detect the differences in the outcome variable between various levels of the treatment and then prove                                 
that these differences are significant and appear due to the average treatment effects caused by the                               
provision of the treatment to the participants, all other variables held constant (Druckman et al 2011,                               
23). Following this prescription, my experimental design will have to adopt the structure of my formal                               
model and test it for the effects of the explanatory variables on the outcome variables that it predicts                                   
(Morton  and  Williams  2010). 
 
While there are many ways to run an experimental study, the one that appears to be the most fitting in                                       
the case of my study is a laboratory experiment. The choice of the laboratory setting, and not a survey                                     
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 or a field type of design, is motivated in part by the conceptual needs stemming from the complexity of                                     
the model that I propose in the Chapter 3 and is preferred by many experimentalists in political science                                   
and behavioural economics (Holt 2007, 9; Iyengar 2011, 75). Naturally, the lab is the only place where                                 
the experimenter can fully control the procedures of the study from the start to the end with the                                   
minimum possibility of noncompliance by the participants. The laboratory space affords the researcher                         
with an extraordinary opportunity to retain even the most sophisticated features of a theoretical model                             
in the experimental design and instruct the participants to act exactly according to the plan set forth in                                   
the design (Druckman et al 2011, 22; Holt 2007; Kittel and Morton 2012, 4). Precisely because of these                                   
attributes laboratory experiments are widely attested to be performing the best on the internal validity                             
characteristic: laboratory experiments are internally valid since they tend to leave the researcher                         
strongly confident that the treatment effects are significant and have arisen from the finely devised and                               
executed experimental design (McDermott 2011, 28). Of course, there are several important                       
considerations  to  keep  in  mind,  namely: 
 
1. Some complexity of the original formal design would likely have to be sacrificed for the sake of                                 
making the experimental instructions as accessible as possible to the participants (Woon 2012,                         
59); 
 
2. The researcher needs to sustain a tight grip on the treatment administering, and the optimal                             
means to this end is to reduce the number of treatments, or ‘moving parts’, to two at most in                                     
order. This is necessary to avoid subsequent failure to distinguish effects and comes at the cost                               
of the inevitable increase in the indeterminacy, or the weakening of the connection to the theory                               
that  stands  behind  the  design  (Holt  2007,  20;  Woon  2012,  56);  
 
3. The experimental environment would need to preserve at least a minimal degree of realistic                           
context, such as some basic political terminology (such as a ‘leader’, a ‘voter’ or an ‘election’),                               
for the participants have to be comfortable with the procedures they are asked to perform while                               




 Clearly, the experimenter has to do quite a bit of hard work to address these points properly. There is a                                       
major caveat that is routinely pointed out in the literature when laboratory experiments are discussed ­                               
their low external validity. This means that even the most elaborate, balanced and neatly conducted                             
laboratory experiment is bound to be detached from reality both in terms of its structure and context, as                                   
well as in terms of the particular sample of participants it is run with (Woon 2012, 59). Very often the                                       
most readily available source of experimental subjects is university students, and it is also the most                               
criticised in academia in terms of the presumed low generalisability of findings obtained with it to the                                 
overall population (Kam, Wilking, and Zechmeister 2007; Sears 1986). However, an argument to the                           
contrary has been made by Druckman and Kam (2009), who cite the need to concentrate on                               
experimental context and the operationalisation of theoretical variables and the statistical evidence of                         
unbiasedness of student­based samples in support of their position. While the second motivation for                           
this study to incorporate a laboratory experiment as its main empirical method is material and stems                               
from the lack of resources to conduct a large­scale field or survey experiment, there is still room to                                   
argue in favour of the high external validity of my experiment. The main remaining issue is that the                                   
viable sample size will have to be small and can only be drawn from a pool of students. Monetary                                     
incentives are a compulsory element of any laboratory experiment (Dickson 2011, 61), as the certainty                             
(or possibility) of receiving cash payment improves the likelihood that the individual will agree to                             
participate. The inevitable disadvantage of guaranteeing monetary rewards to participants for a                       
self­funded study such as mine is obvious: my resources permitted me to attract and compensate only                               
about a couple of dozens of participants. It is then uncontroversial to expect that, due to the Law of                                     




The purpose of this Chapter was to set the stage for an in­depth game­theoretical exploration of the                                 
bargaining game between the factions of a governing party competing against each other to determine                             
the official policy that their party will contest the ensuing election on. The first step is to construct a                                     
formal model describing the behaviour of factions and the voters of the party sequentially with a                               
decision tree outlining the strategies of the players and with the expected utility equations of the actors                                 
for each of its terminal nodes. The electoral uncertainty is to be represented by the imperfect                               
information and probabilities introduced by the nature. The next step involves solving the game for the                               
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 Nash equilibria with backward induction to reveal the strategic profiles that are optimal for all players                               
and analyse the resulting outcomes and constraints, under which they remain stable. The solution                           
discovered is then translated into testable hypotheses. The third step is the laboratory experiment aimed                             
at evaluating the theoretical predictions that are expressed in the hypotheses, which deploys the random                             
assignment of treatments based on the constraints to evince the empirical evidence on the validity of                               







The formal game theoretical model is constructed in the shape of a one­shot (that is, non­repeated:                               
Dixit and Skeath 2004, 22) extensive form game between the actors ­ factions of the incumbent party                                 
and its voters, ­ whose strategic behaviour is being considered. The task of reducing the complexity of                                 
the analysis demands the actors to be considered risk­neutral decision­makers with a linear utility                           
function of the type  u (w) = w (Aliprantis and Chakrabarti 2000, 40). Ceron (2012, 12­13) contends                                 
that: 
factions are indeed rational actors. They are able to take collective decisions and, likewise parties,                             
often  behave  as  if  they  were  a  unitary  actor. 
This understanding of intra­party factions as homogenous and independent actors permits me to                         
present the intra­party process in terms of the sequential collective bargaining of factions to set the                               
official policy of the incumbent party, A, on an abstract issue, the outcome of which is evaluated by the                                     
individual members of the electoral base of the party A. The focus is on the two factions in the party A,                                         
which are known to be of equal size and influence. One of the factions (Reformist) supports a change                                   
in the policy, while the other faction (Conservative) seeks to defend the status quo policy of the party                                   
A. For simplicity, I assume the institutional setting of a two­party system, where the electoral victory                               
means receiving the majority of votes in the election. The incumbent party, A, is divided into two                                 
factions, the informal groupings of its members. The opposition party B is understood to have                             
determined its official policy well ahead of the election, and the voters of the party B in the previous                                     
election are assumed to be prepared to remain unconditionally loyal to B in the upcoming election. In                                 
other words, B does not participate in the game and serves as the last resort for the dissatisfied voters                                     
defecting from the party A. The voters of the party A are assumed to be divided into supporters of the                                       
policy advocated by either of the two of its factions. That is, it is the voter constituency of the                                     
incumbent party that is placed front and centre and is thought to be driving the intra­party bargaining                                 
taking  place  inside  it. 
 
The party B, the two factions of the party A and the voters have transitive preferences described as                                   
ideal points on a Euclidian one­dimensional scale representing the policy space, for which the Nash                             
equilibria are known to always exist (Tsebelis 2002, 20). The Conservative faction and the conservative                             
voters of the type have  C  as their ideal point. The Reformist faction and the reformist voters of the      V C                                  
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 type have  R as their ideal point.  B is the ideal point of the opposition party B and its loyal voters.V R                                            
The absolute values of the distances on the scale, presented in Figure 1, reflect the utility gains and                                   
losses of the actors for the situations, in which they are forced to tolerate a winning point other than                                     
their ideal points. That is, the ranking of the preferences of each actor depends on the length of the                                     
distances, and , such that . If (which is the case illustrated in the Figure 1),  x     y       , y  x   ∈ ℕ*     y > x                     V R  
and the Reformist faction’s preference ranking is  R>C>B . If , it is  R>B>C . and are                  y < x         x     y    
assumed to take only the values that are non­negative integers. The information that is available to the                                  
actors regarding the locations of each other’s ideal points on the policy scale is common for all of them,                                     
and this model examines only the situation where  R is positioned between C and  B . The complications                                 





Note:  C is the Conservative’s ideal point,  R is the Reformist’s ideal point,  B is the ideal point of the opposition party and its                                               
voters,  x  is  the  distance  between  C  and  R,  and  y  is  the  distance  between  R  and  B .  
 
The party A’s electorate, , is divided into the voters who prefer  R to  C , , and the voters who         K ∈ ℕ*                      V R          
like  C better than  R , . One of the two types of voters accounts for the majority of the party A’s          V C                                
supporters at the start of the electoral cycle. The prevalence of either of the voter types in  K is                                     
determined randomly before the intra­party bargaining process begins: is set as the majority voter                V R              
type of N with the probability while becomes the majority type with the probability            0, ]  p ∈ [ 1   V C                




 The decision tree is presented in its extensive form in Figure 2. The ellipses situated around the names                                   
of the actors indicate the information sets, which appear due to the imperfect knowledge concerning the                               
exact electoral conditions that is available to the voters and the factions. The factions have to set the                                   
party’s official policy before the election. Either the Reformist or the Conservative faction must                           
abandon its position for the ideal point of the rival faction to attain unanimity ­ otherwise  C remains as                                     
the party’s official policy point. The breakup of the party is considered impossible, as it is less likely to                                     
occur under restrictive electoral rules of the two­party system setting (Ceron 2012, 188). Once the                             
Nature,  N,  determines the probabilistic properties of the electoral uncertainty, the Reformist faction                         
initiates the sequence of strategic moves by either choosing to propose the policy change (RE) or to                                 
refrain from doing that and defend the current ­ or the status quo ­ policy of the party A instead (SQ).                                         
The Conservative faction will have to respond to the Reformist faction’s reform proposal by selecting                             
either RE to support the proposal, or SQ to protect the status quo policy. The Conservative faction does                                   
not have a possibility to respond if a policy proposal has not been submitted by the Reformist faction.                                   
The uncertainty as to whether the randomly determined majority of  K is of the or the type                            V R       V C    
affects the decision­making process of both voters and the factions of the party A. It is assumed that                                   
the information, on which the actors’ beliefs regarding the probabilities of certain states of the world                               
are based, is acquired from the same source and is identical for the voters and the factions alike. In                                     
addition, the sizes of the minority and majority groups in  K  are the major cause of concern for the                                     
actors, since this uncertain factor might turn out to have unforeseen consequences when the electoral                             
results come in. Once the outcome of intra­party bargaining ­ the official party policy taken to the                                 
election, ­ is announced, the voters decide whether to support the party again (S) or defect to the party                                     
B (D). and make their decisions simultaneously and do not observe each other’s    V R     V C                      
decision­making. This is indicated by the information sets placed around their decision nodes. The                           
non­voting strategy is excluded from the voters’ strategy sets (that is, a combination of choices                             
available to them: Aliprantis and Chakrabarti 2000, 58) in order to minimise the complexity of the                               
model  and  shall  be  addressed  in  future  improvements  to  the  model. 
 
The voters’ cost of voting is assumed to be balanced out by the utility of not bearing the cost of social                                         
pressure (Gerber, Green and Larimer 2008). The cost of supporting party A when the internal                             
policy­setting outcome has not been unanimous is also thought to be absent from their calculus. The                               
voters are assumed to have complete information only on the final outcome of the intra­party                             
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 bargaining: the policy­setting process is understood to be perfectly non­transparent. The voters and the                           
factions are assumed to be motivated by their policy ideal points, which leads them to experience utility                                 
gains from reaching their ideal point on the scale and utility losses from moving farther away from it.                                   
Thus, the goal of the factions is to adopt a party policy that satisfies their own policy preferences as                                     
well as the preferences of their voters in  K . The factions and the voters who helped their party win gain                                       
maximum utility only from seeing their preferred policy ­ be it  C  or R ­ implemented and lose utility                                     
from tolerating a winning policy point that fails to match their ideal points. All actors seek to maximise                                   
their  expected  utility  by  choosing  the  most  beneficial  strategy. 
 
Figure 2. The extensive form game of intra­party bargaining between the factions and the voters                             
of  the  party  A.  
 
Note: R and C  indicate the Reformist faction and the Conservative faction’s decision nodes (Dixit and Skeath 2004, 46)                                     
respectively. The terminal nodes of the decision tree are numbered 1 through 12 and are referred to by their numbers                                       
throughout  the  Chapter. 
 
With all essential and simplifying assumptions of the model set out above, it is now necessary to write                                   
down the utility equations (or payoffs) of the actors for all 12 outcomes that can be produced in the                                     
course of the game. The core logic that informs the structures of the payoffs that are laid out in the                                       
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The discussion of the model setting from the previous section suggests that choice of either ‘support’ or                                 
‘defect’ strategy by the voters belonging to the majority type (set by the Nature to be either or                                 V R    V C
with probabilities and respectively) should result in remarkably different outcomes for each of    p      1 − p                    
the four players in the game, as the deliberation products of the majority­type voters are decisive with                                 
regard to the winner of the election. However, the cases where the players encounter additional                             
uncertainty besides not knowing which type of voters is the majority type are the ones where the                                 
minority­type voter selects the defection strategy. It is thus imperative for the party A to satisfy the                                 
following  condition  if  it  is  to  emerge  victorious: 
2,  K − KV C > E/
where is the number of the minority­type voters in  K when is the majority type. That  KV C               V )( C           V R            
is, the number of party A supporters has to remain greater than one half of the total electorate in case                                       
the minority­type voters choose to defect to the opposition party. In the second hypothetical situation,                             
the  condition 
2  K − KV R > E/
has to be true, where is the number of voters who belong to the minority voter type, when          KV R                         V R    
is the majority type in the party A’s voter base. The implications of this condition are similar toV C                                      
those of the first one. The description of the payoffs that all actors stand to receive in each of the 12                                         
possible outcomes from the decision tree in Figure 2 is given below. The reverse order, in which the                                   




First, it is necessary to consider the case where both factions sequentially selected RE over SQ (the                                 
node marked as 1 in Figure 2). The outcome in question is that of the party A winning the election with                                         
a reformed official policy and the support of  K of its voters. This is also a unique case, as none of the                                           
rest of the hypothetical strategic sequences lead to a unanimously adopted policy reform being                           
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 approved by the totality of the party A’s electorate. Where the strategy RE has been unanimously                               
chosen by the party A, and has chosen S over D, supporting the party A will give the            V R                         V C    
following  expected  utility: 
(v ) 1 )(v ),  EUV C = p − x + ( − p − x
where is the maximum amount of utility an actor gains, when the winning policy point coincides  v                                
with their own ideal point. The first part of the sum represents ’s utility of selecting S over D if                        V C                
is the majority type of voters in  K with probability , while the second part reflects ’s utilityV R                       p            V C    
of doing so when its type is the majority type of voters in  K with probability . The expected                                 1 − p      
utility  equation  above  can  then  be  reduced  to 
.  EUV C = v − x  
It demonstrates that a conservative­type voter stands to gain exactly the same utility regardless of the                               
distribution of voters in  K  by type that was predetermined by the Nature and will always incur the loss                                     
of utility from tolerating the winning point that is  x  points farther than their ideal point on the scale.                                     
Upon  reaching  the  terminal  node  1,  the  voter  of     type  is  left  withV R  
,v 1 )v  EUV R = p + ( − p  
which  is  simplified  to 
.EUV R = v  
This payoff structure reflects the fact that ’s utility gain at the terminal node 1 corresponds to its              V R                      
maximum value possible, as the game is completed with  R  as its winning policy point. The payoffs of                                   
the  factions  are  similar  to  those  of  the  voters  and  can  be  described  as 
 EUCre = v − x  
and 
vEURre =    




This outcome is a hypothetical situation, in which the conservative segment of the party A’s voter base,                                 
, moves to reject the unanimously adopted policy reform, that is also backed by the reformistKV C                                
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 voters.  Choosing D over S after strategies RE­RE­S were selected by the other three actors will yield                                 
the  expected  utility  of  the  following  structure  to  the  conservative­type  voters: 
(q (v ) 1 )(v )) 1 )(v ),  EUV C = p 1 − x + ( − q1 − x − y + ( − p − x − y
where is the probability that The first half of the right­hand side of the  0, ]  q1 ∈ [ 1         2.  K − KV C > E/                  
equation reflects the need for to consider the danger of being a decisive minority­type voter. The          V C                        
reason why does not have to consider on the second half of the right side of the equation is    V C             q1                          
intuitive: notwithstanding the similarity to the payoffs for the same strategic outcome when is the                         V R      
majority type, with the move by to defect to the opposition party will instantly deprive the       1 − p       V C                      
party A of its majority support in the electorate. The defection of the majority­type voters always hands                                 
the victory to the party B, as demonstrated by the ’s loss of both  x and  y  due to its defection being                    V C                        
pivotal.  For  the  reformist­type  voters,  the  sequence  of  RE­RE­S­D  yields 
(q v 1 )(v )) 1 )(v ),  EUV R = p 1 + ( − q1 − y + ( − p − y
which differs from ’s choice on the amount of utility loss sustained by in case of the party B’s      V C                    V R              
loss. It should be equal to just  y,  and the success in the gamble grants the maximum utility gain                              V R        
possible. The composition of factionalist payoffs is modelled with the same considerations in mind.                           
The  Conservative  faction  is  set  to  gain 
(q (v ) 1 )(v )) 1 )(v ),  EUCre = p 1 − x + ( − q1 − x − y + ( − p − x − y
while  the  Reformist  faction  should  end  up  with 
p(q v 1 )(v )) 1 )(v ).  EURre =   1 + ( − q1 − y + ( − p − y
 
3.2.3.  Terminal  node  3:  RE­RE­D­S.  
Under this terminal node, the unanimous and publicly announced reformed official policy of the party                             
A is rejected by the reformist­type voters and is supported by the rest of its electoral base. However                                   
unlikely this situation may seem, the methodological requirement for the extensive form game                         
theoretical analysis is that the expected utility equations have to be outlined for all actors for each                                 
hypothetical alternative outcome ­ if only for the sake of posterity. When selects D in Case A and                       V R              
chooses  S,  the  expected  utilities  of     and     are  formulated  in  the  following  fashion:V C V C V R  
(v ) 1 )(q v 1 )(v ))  EUV R = p − y + ( − p 2 + ( − q2 − y
and 
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 (v ) 1 )(q (v ) 1 )(v )),  EUV C = p − x − y + ( − p 2 − x + ( − q2 − x − y
where is the probability that . Thus, the actors have to take notice of the  0, ]  q2 ∈ [ 1         2  K − KV R > E/                    
risk associated with the potential defection of , whether they are a majority­ or a minority­type              V R                  
voters. If the voters from this group do indeed resort to defection, all players stand to lose utility, with                                     
the Conservative faction and voters of the same type being forced to move all the way from  C to  B.  The                                         
Conservative  and  Reformist  factions  will  have  to  calculate 
(v ) 1 )(q (v ) 1 )(v ))  EUCre = p − x − y + ( − p 2 − x + ( − q2 − x − y
and 




In this case, the official policy proposed by the party is a new one, yet the electorate moves to                                     
unanimously reject it in favour of the opposition party’s policy. The simultaneous choice of D by the                                 
voters  of  both  types  should  lead     to  obtainV C  
(v ) 1 )(v )  EUV C = p − x − y + ( − p − x − y  
simplified  as 
,  EUV C = v − x − y
while     is  certain  to  receiveV R  
(v ) 1 )(v )  EUV R = p − y + ( − p − y
or 
.  EUV R = v − y
The interpretation of these payoffs is uncontroversial: the players will have to sustain significant losses,                             
as the winning point,  B, is not the ideal point of any of them. The Reformist faction and voters are                                       
however  less  seriously  affected  by  this  outcome.  The  factionalist  payoffs  are 
v  EUCre =   − x − y
and 
v .  EURre =   − y
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 The remaining cases can be described in pairs, the main reason being that the expected utility equations                                 
of the actors are formulated in precisely the same manner for the pairs of nodes 5 and 9, 6 and 10, 7                                           




In the terminal node 5, the factions have selected RE and SQ correspondingly, leaving the old official                                 
policy in place due to the lack of the unanimous decision to reform it. In the terminal node 9, the choice                                         
of the Reformist faction was to avoid proposing the policy reform, which means that the status quo                                 
policy has been preserved without any opposition from the Conservative faction. The prior assumption                           
was that the voters do not suffer any utility losses from voting for a party divided by internal conflict.                                     
Taking account of the fact that the outcome of the bargaining is identical for the two nodes, it is clear                                       
that the utility equations and the subsequent analysis should not be different depending on the node. If                                 
  chooses  S  over  D,   ’s  choice  of  S  will  result  in:V R V C  
v 1 )v  EUV C = p + ( − p
or  
.EUV C = v  
This is the exact opposite of the outcome in the terminal node 1, as it is the conservative­type voters                                     
that are gaining the maximum utility thanks to their ideal point matching the winning point, while the                                 
reformist­type voters are forced to accept an unfavourable policy. For the resulting expected utility                   V R          
will  be 
(v ) 1 )(v )  EUV R = p − x + ( − p − x
or 
.  EUV R = v − x
Likewise,  the  Reformist  and  Conservative  factions  will  get 
EUCsq = v  
and 





Here, the defection of is clearly counterintuitive. Yet the analysis has to include the utility        V C                        
equations for these two outcomes as well. Should select D over S instead of following ’s suit,                V C                V R    
the  voters’  payoffs  will  be: 
(q v 1 )(v )) 1 )(v )  EUV C = p 1 + ( − q1 − x − y + ( − p − x − y
and 
(q (v ) 1 )(v )) 1 )(v ).  EUV R = p 1 − x + ( − q1 − y + ( − p − y
The defection strategy would put ’s own benefit in severe jeopardy, while certainly causing a great          V C                      
deal of pain to the Conservative faction and possibly to the Reformist faction and their supporters. The                                 
utility  of  these  outcomes  for  the  factions  can  be  expressed  as 
(q v 1 )(v )) 1 )(v )  EUCsq = p 1 + ( − q1 − x − y + ( − p − x − y
and 
(q (v ) 1 )(v )) 1 )(v ).  EURsq = p 1 − x + ( − q1 − y + ( − p − y
 
3.2.7.  Terminal  nodes  7  and  11:  RE­SQ­D­S  and  SQ­D­S.  
These two outcomes can reasonably be expected, as is likely to be unhappy about the preservation               V R                  
of the status quo policy by the party and could choose to punish it by defecting to the party B. If                                         V R
indeed  chooses  D  over  S,  the  payoffs  to  be  awarded  given   ’s  choice  of  S  will  be:V C  
(v ) 1 )(q v 1 )(v ))  EUV C = p − x − y + ( − p 2 + ( − q2 − x − y
and 
(v ) 1 )(q (v ) 1 )(v )).  EUV R = p − y + ( − p 2 − x + ( − q2 − y
Given the relative realism of this hypothetical result, the considerable risk is potentially borne by the                               
players  (especially  by  the  Conservative  faction  and   ).  The  factions  will  receiveV C  
(v ) 1 )(q v 1 )(v ))  EUCsq = p − x − y + ( − p 2 + ( − q2 − x − y
and 




Finally, if the voters of both types decide to defect to the party B in any of these two cases, their                                         
expected  utilities  are  defined  by  the  following  equations: 
(v ) 1 )(v )  EUV C = p − x − y + ( − p − x − y = v − x − y  
and 
(v ) 1 )(v ) .  EUV R = p − y + ( − p − y = v − y
 
For  the  factions,  this  would  result  in  the  following  distribution  of  payoffs: 
 EUCsq = v − x − y
and 
.  EURsq = v − y
 
3.3.  The  backward  induction. 
Backward induction, the core analytical technique that is utilised here to deliver a solution to the                               
model, prescribes that the strategies of all players be considered starting with the comparison of the last                                 
actor’s strategic choices and then proceeding upwards with the comparison of the preceding actors’                           
strategies given the choices found optimal for the succeeding actors. Whenever a constraint is born out                               
of the comparison, it should be introduced to the assessment of the complete strategy profile for the                                 
outcome in focus. If in a hypothetical case the expected outcome of a particular strategic choice of the                                   
actor is such that there exists a better alternative which can be chosen instead, the actor will always                                   
prefer the more beneficial strategy. In cases where several alternatives can be considered optimal                           
depending on a specific constraint applied, the multiple optimal strategies are permitted. The subgame                           
perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) is discovered, when the sequence beginning at the root of the tree and                                 
ending at the terminal node is found to consist of strategies that are optimal for every player with a                                     
choice in the sequence. Due to the presence of imperfect information, all actors have to completely                               
exhaust  the  list  of  comparisons  that  stems  from  the  decision  tree.  
 
It has to be noted that this section comprises only the cases that are bound by the context of total                                       
uncertainty, where the probabilities  p, and never assume the extreme values of 0 and 1:          q1   q2                  
. This restriction is quite intuitive in the sense that information on the preferences of, q 0, )  p, q  1   2 ∈ ( 1                              
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 electorates is generally known to be imperfect in the real world, and the forecasts that entertain the                                 
certainty of an imminent and landslide victory by a political party cannot be wholeheartedly confirmed                             
until the official vote count figures are finalised and released to the public. A further restriction has to                                   
be made on the policy preferences by ignoring the situation where . This would likely lead to the                      x = y              
disappearance of equality signs and limit the number of equilibria in the game to few constrained                               
strategy profiles. The equidistance of  R from other points on the scale, as well as the equality element                                   
in the condition which contains and and probabilities at the same time, constitute a special case of          x     y                        
indifference between two of the remaining outcomes in the decision­making attitudes of the actors. The                             
equidistance can be set aside in order to concentrate the analytical effort on the more pronounced cases,                                 
especially granted that it would be difficult to come up with an example of factionalist policy                               
preferences positioned in such fashion, as it would likely cause confusion and ambivalence in the                             
party’s electorate and the perhaps inside the party itself. I have also conducted the analysis under the                                 
original broad assumption about the probabilities and kept the equality signs: the full list of equilibria                               
that  were  found  to  exist  is  reported  in  the  Appendix  1  to  this  thesis. 
 
3.3.1.  The  conservative  voter,   .V C   
The backward induction begins with the assessment of choices of the conservative­type voter. The                           
comparison is to be made between the ’s strategies for the following pairs of terminal nodes: 1 and             V C                      
2, 3 and 4, 5 (9) and 6 (10), and 7 (11) and 8 (12). The comparisons for the last two pairs of nodes will                                                 
be presented jointly with those for the preceding two pairs due to the payoffs being identical. If is                                 V C  
to  prefer  S  to  D,  their  utility  in  the  terminal  node  1  has  to  exceed  that  in  the  terminal  node  2: 
(q (v ) 1 )(v )) 1 )(v ).  v − x ≥ p 1 − x + ( − q1 − x − y + ( − p − x − y
The  simplification  of  this  inequality  yields 
(1 q ) ,  y − p 1 > 0
which always holds as each of the variables can only be positive numbers. Thus, strictly prefers S                            V C      
to D when faced with a choice between the outcomes 1 and 2. For the pair of outcomes 3 and 4, the                                           
conservative  voter  will  have  to  consider 
(v ) 1 )(q (v ) 1 )(v ))  p − x − y + ( − p 2 − x + ( − q2 − x − y ≥ v − x − y
for  it  to  benefit  from  S  more  than  from  D.  This  inequality  in  its  reduced  form  can  be  transformed  into 
q (1 ) .  y 2 − p > 0
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 This constraint can be interpreted as restricting ’s optimal options to S. In the comparison of 5 (9)              V C                      
and  6  (10),  the  conservative  voter  picks  S  over  D  if 
(q v 1 )(v )) 1 )(v )  v ≥ p 1 + ( − q1 − x − y + ( − p − x − y
holds  true.  This  is  indeed  the  case,  as  follows  from  the  simplification  of  the  strictly  correct  inequality: 
x )(1 ) .  ( + y − pq1 > 0
As dictated by the assumptions of the model, should always select S over D under this constraint.                V C                  
The last comparison that the conservative voter must consider is between 7 (11) and 8 (12). For S to be                                       
preferred  over  D,  the  inequality 
(v ) 1 )(q v 1 )(v ))  p − x − y + ( − p 2 + ( − q2 − x − y ≥ v − x − y
must  be  satisfied.  By  simplifying  this  I  find 
(x )(1 ) ,  q2 + y − p > 0
which is never violated under the assumptions of the model and means that strictly favours their                          V C      
strategy S over D. At this point it is safe to say that the strategic profiles resulting in those outcomes                                       
that are marked with even numbers on the decision tree ­ namely, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12, ­ will never be                                             





3.3.2.  The  reformist  voter,   .V R   
The next actor that should be examined for optimal strategic behaviour is , whose turn to decide                        V R          
arrives immediately before ’s , as shown on the tree in Figure 2. The outcomes 1 and 3, as well as 5     V C                                      
(9) and 7 (11) have to be scrutinised pairwise in order to disclose the optimal strategies of the reformist                                     
voter.  The  first  inequality  to  regard  is 
(v ) 1 )(q v 1 )(v )).  v ≥ p − y + ( − p 2 + ( − q2 − y
It  describes  the  situation  when  choosing  S  over  D  is  optimal  for  the  player  and  can  be  reformulated  as 
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 q ) ,  y(1 − q2 + p 2 > 0
a strict constraint that makes it imperative for to select S. The remaining comparison can be                V R                  
written  as  the  following,  if   is  to  prefer  S  to  D:V R  
(v ) 1 )(q (v ) 1 )(v )),  v − x ≥ p − y + ( − p 2 − x + ( − q2 − y
which,  under  the  prior  assumptions  made  about  probabilities,  is  reduced  to 
.x < y  
In  this  case,  the  constraint  is  weak  due  to  the  possibility  that   ,  and  it  can  be  rewritten  as x − y > 0   
,x > y  
which induces the reformist voter to be either indifferent between S and D when the equality sign                                 







For the Conservative faction the pairs of outcomes, for which their expected utilities have to be                               
juxtaposed, are located on the left­hand side of the decision tree. The pairs of terminal nodes in focus                                   
are 1 and 5 (9), and 1 and 7 (11). For the first pair of outcomes to be assessed robustly, the                                         
Conservative faction has to take notice of the constraint that binds the optimality of the outcome                x < y                
5  for  the  reformist  voter.  The  actor  prefers  RE  to  SQ  if 
,  v − x ≥ v
or 
,  x ≤ 0
which is never true. That is, the Conservative faction will always find the SQ strategy optimal and will                                   
likewise be satisfied with the outcome 9, even though they do not have an opportunity to directly                                 
influence it. The second comparison takes into account the constraint from the analysis of ’s                  x > y            V R  
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 strategizing and implies the following inequality must hold true for the Conservative faction to choose                             
RE  over  SQ: 
(v ) 1 )(q v 1 )(v )),  v − x ≥ p − x − y + ( − p 2 + ( − q2 − x − y
which  can  be  simplified  to 




(1 )  q2 − p ≥
y
x+y







The interpretation of the outcome 1 is definitive, as the Reformist faction stands to secure the                               
maximum utility gain possible by selecting RE if the constraints, under which the Conservative faction                             
chooses RE and the party’s voters choose S unanimously ( and ), hold. Therefore,                  x > y     (1 )  q2 − p ≤
y
x+y      
the first SPNE of the game can be written as (RE, RE, S, S) given the constraints. The first faction to                                         
make a move has to carefully consider the difference between its expected utility of the following pairs                                 
of  outcomes:  5  and  9,  as  well  as  7  and  11.  For  the  former  pair,  the  inequality  can  be  written  as 
,v  v − x ≥   − x  
which is always a strict equality. The Reformist faction will select either RE or SQ, if this is the case                                       
with the constraint. The strategy profiles (RE, SQ, S, S) and (SQ, S, S) can thus be considered to    x < y                                    
be the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the game. The comparison of the latter pair of outcomes for                                   
the  Reformist  faction  leads  to 
(v ) 1 )(q (v ) 1 )(v )) (v ) 1 )(q (v ) 1 )(v )),  p − y + ( − p 2 − x + ( − q2 − y = p − y + ( − p 2 − x + ( − q2 − y
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 confirming that (RE, SQ, D, S) and (SQ, D, S) are the SPNE of the game when and                                  x > y    
are true. Table 4 compiles the findings I obtained from performing the backward(1 )  q2 − p ≥
y







What can be instantly inferred from the results of the backward induction presented in Table 4? One                                 
important general observation is that even with the stringent boundaries imposed on probabilities and                           
policy distance variables there exist equilibria which share the same constraint. This result in essence                             
implies that while the solution to the model narrows down the number of possible strategy profiles, the                                 
cases where the Reformist faction and other actors appear to exhibit indifference to the strategic                             
alternatives they have at their disposal have not been entirely eliminated. What strikes me the most is                                 
that in several equilibria this indifference is tied to the certainty of information on some of the                                 
probability values available to the actors. One possible explanation is that the model performs well                             
with respect to predicting all possible patterns of behaviour of the actors, while failing to determine                               
unique and exclusive equilibria. The factions and the voters of course were found to act in a certain                                   
way under fairly explicit conditions. However, none of the equilibria, with a notable exception of the                               





Despite the fact that the five equilibria set out in Table 4 at first glance might seem to paint an                                       
inconclusive and vague picture of intra­party bargaining and voting with multiple equilibria existing                         
simultaneously, a number of clear testable propositions starts to emerge upon a closer examination.                           
First, the pair of equilibria (2) and (4) are clearly different from the (1), (3) and (5). These two groups                                       
of equilibria are in fact mutually exclusive, as the former exists under the  x < y constraint that                                   
eliminates the chance of the latter to produce optimal strategic profiles for the game. To put more                                 
simply and relate this finding to the policy space I modelled in the section 3.1 of this Chapter, the                                     
location of  R  closer to  C  on the scale than to the ideal point of the opposition party B has an                                         
extraordinary impact on the behaviour of the rational actors of the game in terms of restricting the                                 
menu of strategies for the Conservative faction and the voters of both types to just one. Under (2) and                                     
(4) all of the three actors I named will have to defend the status quo policy of the party in order to                                           
maximise their expected utilities of the corresponding outcomes. While the Reformist faction                       
nominally is indifferent between its strategies RE and SQ, their actual choice obviously will have no                               
bearing on the subsequent rollout of strategies by other actors. The other direct implication of (2) and                                 
(4) is that all actors are expected to weigh only the policy distance difference while making their                                 





Note:  C is the Conservative’s ideal point,  R is the Reformist’s ideal point,  B is the ideal point of the opposition party and its                                               
voters,  x  is  the  distance  between  C  and  R,  and  y  is  the  distance  between  R  and  B .  
 
The higher level of complexity is introduced to the game once  R  becomes positioned in closer                               
proximity to  B  than to  C , which results in the policy distance condition being shifted to  x > y . Figure 3                                         
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 illustrates the case. (2) and (4) are automatically removed from the vocabulary of the actors and are                                 
replaced by (1), (3) and (5). Depending on the specific values that probabilities  p  and and the policy                              q2      
distance variables x and  y assume, the assortment of simultaneously possible equilibria may change.                           
For instance, if the second constraint of the three strategic profiles is written as an equality                               
, all three are allowed on the list of options contemplated by the actors at their(1 )  q2 − p =
y
x+y                                
respective stages of the game. With a 10­point policy scale where  C  is 1 and  B  is 10, the term on the                                           
right­hand side of the equation can be equal to approximately 0.44. Such a setting would naturally                               
require a good balance to be present between the values of the two parts of the left­hand side term,                                     
where neither is allowed to be greater than 0.65. This is definitely a fragile solution, which lends                                 
support to the argument that the indifference of the actors between the three possible equilibria in this                                 
case arises from the reasonably high risks they associate with the electoral outcome and the difficulty                               
of drawing a meaningful comparison between the combined risk and the policy distance difference. Let                             
us continue with the same numeric example. Where the right­hand side constraint is ,                          (1 )  q2 − p <
y
x+y  
(1) is a unique equilibrium. This is an extraordinary result, as the intra­party policy reform that the                                 
lessons from the real­life politics made so painfully clear cannot be accomplished with ease and does                               
not surface as a frequent outcome of factionalist interaction indeed should be a problematic and rare                               
occurrence. The lower the multiplication term composed of the probabilities is and the closer  R  in the                                 
example to the middle of the road between  C and  B , the higher the likelihood of (1). In other words,                                       
even with a close­to­the­middle  R  at least one of the probabilities should be negligible for the players to                                   
end up with this strategic profile. restricts the variety of choice of the actors to (3) and            (1 )  q2 − p >
y
x+y                      
(5), where the greater value of the left­hand side probabilistic term and the lower right­hand side policy                                 
distance­based term should yield the imminent defection of the reformist­minded voters provoked by                         
the certain failure of the party A’s factions to adopt a reform proposal ­ if it was on the table at all.                                           
Quite intuitively, the Conservative faction under (3) and (5) is highly likely to take the risk and oppose                                   
the policy reform. This makes the type of utility functions of the factions an interesting point to explore                                   
in connection with the model: as there is no consensus in the literature as to whether the politicians are                                     
keen to avoid the risk, are neutral to it as assumed here, or are daring (Morton 1999, 38), the propensity                                       
of the Conservative faction to oppose policy change in such uncertain conditions could be dramatically                             
different under an alternative assumption. The last observation that I feel obliged to emphasise is that                               
in particular is a very uncertain probabilistic variable that partially is a function of  p. Hence, theq2                                  
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 actors should be ready to seek appropriate information to estimate its value: one can imagine that in the                                   
real life the politicians in factions and the voters will have to rely on a combination of opinion polling                                     
and expert analysis in that regard. Table 5 contains the summary of the predicted outcomes with their                                 
determinants  based  on  the  interpretation  of  the  equilibria. 
There are practical implications for the theory of intra­party bargaining that the model gives rise to. For                                 
instance, the equilibria demonstrate that the factions might be eager to use position­taking as a means                               
to force their preferred policy agenda through when their size and influence is equal or relatively                               
similar. This is especially consequential for the Reformist faction, which will likely seek to obtain                             
precise information on the electoral mood to determine whether it can place itself closer to the                               
opposition party in the policy space and issue threats to the Conservative faction by arguing using the                                 
probabilistic evidence that the number of defecting voters can be potentially devastating if the policy is                               
not reformed. In the two­party setting of the model, which the Duverger’s law (1954) permits under the                                 
one­round multi­district elections with plurality rule, there are simply no third parties positioned to the                             
left of the Conservative faction, making it difficult for them to resist such a policy proposal where the                                   
available information points to the higher likelihood of desertion by voters if the status quo is                               
preserved. However, this kind of danger does not arise often, which may explain why some political                               





Note: the upward­looking arrow indicates that the increase in the corresponding term is                         





In the Chapter 2, I argued the case of a laboratory experiment as the most appropriate method of                                   
evaluating the predictions of a formal model that is characterised by a high degree of internal validity.                                 
Consequently, the observations I made in the present discussion about the optimal behaviour of factions                             
and voters and the conditions, under which various intra­party policy decisions and electoral outcomes                           
are predicted to come into existence, on the basis of the solutions discovered for the model of                                 
intra­party bargaining and voter response. It is inferred from the model that there are three variables                               
that determine the strategic choices of the actors: a) the difference between policy distances  x and  y , b)                                   
p , the probability of Reformist being the majority type in the electorate and c) , the probability that                            q2        
the defection of the minority­type Reformist voters will not lead to the electoral victory of the                               
opposition party B. Thus, it can be said that these three variables have causal impact on the key results                                     
of the game, the decision of the factions on the official party policy and the party that wins the election.                                       
To proceed with the empirical analysis at the maximum level of efficiency, a set of testable hypotheses                                 
has to be put forward for a subsequent experimental examination. The first hypothesis is derived from                               
the equilibria (2) and (4) of the game and corresponds to the outcome where the factions of the party A                                       
decide  to  take  the  status  quo  policy  to  the  election,  which  is  then  won  by  the  party  A. 
Hypothesis 1 :  where the ideal point of the Reformist faction and the voters of the                             
Reformist type is situated closer to the ideal point of the Conservative faction and                           
voters than to the ideal point of the opposition party B on the policy scale (that is,  x ­                                     
y < 0 ), the current official policy of the incumbent party A is preserved, and the party                                 
A  wins  the  election . 
The second hypothesis reflects the equilibria (1), (3) and (5) is split into three parts. The first part deals                                     
with the situation where the factions choose to reform the official party policy, and their party                               
eventually  wins  the  election. 
Hypothesis 2.1 :  where the ideal point of the Reformist faction and the voters of the                             
Reformist type is situated closer to the ideal point of the opposition party B than to                               
the ideal point of the Conservative faction and voters on the policy scale (that is,  x ­ y                                   
> 0 ), and the policy distance difference considerations outweigh the electoral                     
uncertainty considerations in the actors’ reasoning (  ), the official            (1 )q2 − p <
y
x+y      
policy  of  the  incumbent  party  A  is  reformed,  and  the  party  A  wins  the  election . 
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 The second part illustrates the outcome, in which the official party policy is not changed, and the voters                                   
of the Reformist type are expected to defect to the opposition party B and potentially help it to win the                                       
election. 
Hypothesis 2.2 :  where the ideal point of the Reformist faction and the voters of the                             
Reformist type is situated closer to the ideal point of the opposition party B than to                               
the ideal point of the Conservative faction and voters on the policy scale (that is,  x ­ y                                   
> 0 ), and the electoral uncertainty considerations outweigh the policy distance                     
difference considerations in the actors’ reasoning (  ), the current            (1 )q2 − p >
y
x+y      
official policy of the incumbent party A is preserved, and either the party A or the                               
party  B  wins  the  election . 
The equal possibility of equilibria (1), (3) and (5) is formulated in the third part of the second                                   
hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 2.3 :  where the ideal point of the Reformist faction and the voters of the                             
Reformist type is situated closer to the ideal point of the opposition party B than to                               
the ideal point of the Conservative faction and voters on the policy scale (that is,  x ­ y                                   
> 0 ), and the electoral uncertainty considerations are equal to the policy distance                         
difference considerations in the actors’ reasoning (  ), the official party            (1 )q2 − p =
y
x+y        
policy can either be preserved or reformed, where the latter results in a victory of the                               
party  A,  and  the  former  results  either  in  the  victory  of  the  party  A  or  of  the  party  B.  
Notwithstanding the complexity of the calculations and the simplistic abstraction of the policy space                           
and the institutional arrangement of the model, the equilibria I discovered are clearly                         
thought­provoking, realistic in many respects and provide sufficient material for the empirical testing                         
presented in the Chapter 4. The model in its most basic and simple rational choice­influenced form has                                 
direct implications for the way the internal life of a political party is conceived of as well as for our                                       
understanding of the policy­ and uncertainty­related deliberation that voters undertake. The hypotheses                       







The laboratory experiment presented in this Chapter is founded on the premises of the model from the                                 7
Chapter 3 and is aimed at testing the outcomes identified in the discussion section of that Chapter.                                 
Naturally, the primary purpose of this experiment is the evaluation of the four hypotheses about the                               
behaviour of factions and voters of the incumbent party A that I outlined in the concluding paragraphs                                 
of the discussion of the equilibria of the game. In other words, the aim is to examine the relationship                                     
predicted to bind the  independent (explanatory) variables of the model, the policy distance difference                           
(the difference between  x and  y ) and the electoral uncertainty, and its  dependent (outcome) variables ,                             




In order to prevent any emotional bias from arising and affecting the behaviour of participants in the                                 
course of the experiment, all charged references to politics and ideology were removed from the                             
instructions and visual materials. The terms ‘conservative’ and ‘reformist’ were replaced with ‘black’                         
and ‘red’ in all instances of their use. Likewise, the incumbent and opposition parties in the experiment                                 
were referred to as the ‘party A’ and the ‘party B’, while the term ‘faction’ was substituted with the                                     
term ‘group leader’. A 10­point policy scale showing the locations of the ideal policy points of the                                 
group leaders and the voters of two types, Black and Red, the ideal point of the party B, the numerical                                       
equivalents of the distances  x and  y and the distance between Black and party B (which was set to be                                       
equal to 9 for all 12 rounds of the game) was displayed on a screen. The location of the Red point was                                           
changed twice during the session: first, after the practice round and then again, at the beginning of the                                   
round 7 to reflect the change of the policy distance difference treatment. In addition, each participant                               
received a sheet of paper with the policy scale on it, which was replaced for rounds 7­12. A deck of                                       8
playing cards containing 10 cards of Black and Red colours was utilised in the random assignment of                                 
7 The laboratory experiment is self­funded and was conducted by the author of this thesis with the assistance of the first­year                                         
and second­year students at the Master’s Degree Programme in Public Choice, formerly known as MDP in Quantitative                                 




 voter types. The number of Red cards in the deck was written on the whiteboard and announced at the                                     
start of rounds 1, 4, 7 and 10. This number reflects the probability  p of Reformist­type voters being a                                     
majority in the party A’s electorate. The electoral uncertainty in the experiment is represented by the                               
probability  p , while is excluded from the treatment assigned to the participants. The main reason      q2                        
behind this omission is to simplify the analysis of the data gathered from the experiment. The                               
measurement of treatment effects would be severely impeded if three independent variables were                         
included in the design: Holt (2007, 20) notes that even with just two ‘moving parts’ establishing the                                 
causes of a change in observed behaviour could prove complicated. In addition, the exclusion of the                               
second probability variable improves the ecological validity of the experimental setting by making it                           
somewhat more realistic (Holbrook 2011, 149), as the actual voters especially ­ and, perhaps, the                             
politicians as well ­ would likely find the complete deliberative procedures described in the model                             
rather daunting. The other justification is the scarcity of funding, which made it virtually impossible for                               




Two one­hour, 12­round sessions were organised, and four different treatment combinations were                       
administered per session. The number of rounds chosen was motivated by the desire to increase the                               
number of observations for the outcome variables for each session. First, the rounds 1 through 3 were                                 
played with the ‘negative difference between  x and y and p = 0.4’ treatment combination. The ‘negative                                 
difference between  x and  y and p = 0.6’ treatment arrangement was provided during the rounds 4­6.                                 
The ‘positive difference between  x and  y and p = 0.4’ treatment followed for rounds 7­9. Rounds 10­12                                   
of the ‘positive difference between x and y and p = 0.6’ treatment permutation concluded the session.                                 
These two sessions were conducted under the order I of treatment provision. The other two sessions                               
mirrored the ones just described in all by the order of treatment provision. In the order II sessions, the                                     
last two treatments of the order I were activated during the first 6 rounds, while the first two treatments                                     
were moved to the second half of the session. In laboratory experiments, this design pattern is normally                                 
employed to control for potential order effects: the treatment effects discovered for the experiment have                             
to hold regardless of the sequence, in which the treatments were offered to the participants (Battaglini,                               
Morton and Palfrey 2010, 72; Sieberg et al 2013, 379). The choice of these two specific levels of the                                     
probability treatment is based on 1) the need to control for the effect that a lower or a higher probability                                       
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 p might have on the outcomes suggested by the hypotheses, on 2) the necessity of recording whether                                 
such effect, if present, will hold even with probability levels located in close proximity to each other,                                 




The experiment is designed along the lines of the game theoretical model and replicates the strategic                               
decision­making of its actors. Each session of the experiment was played with a group of 6 participants                                 
with an earnings practice and a practice round preceding the main body of the game. First, the                                 
participants were offered to select an instruction sheet they would keep throughout the session at                             9
random from a pack of 6 sheets. The participant number and role were written at the top of the front                                       
side of each sheet. That is, four participants were randomly assigned to play as the voters of the party A                                       
and two participants as either a Red or a Black group leader for the total duration of the session. The                                       
main part of the instructions describing the setting and the outline of the game was read out loud to all                                       
participants. Participants were informed that the voter players would be assigned either Red or Black as                               
their preferred policy point at the beginning of each round. They were also told that the party B would                                     
always be supported by one hypothetical voter. Participants were then asked to familiarise themselves                           
with the last paragraph, which differed depending on the role that they were assigned. Players were                               
instructed to avoid all types of interaction with other participants and address their questions to the                               
experimenter and the assistants at any time. Participants were asked to record the relevant information                             
(the number of Red cards, the personal colour [voters only], the decision of the group leaders, the                                 
winning policy point and the personal earnings per round) in the appropriate row of the table on the                                   
reverse side of the instruction sheet. Next, each participant was given an earnings practice sheet and                               10
instructed to quickly solve a set of simple tasks aimed at ensuring that they understand the concept of                                   
policy points and are able to calculate their hypothetical earnings based on it. A practice round was                                 







Just as the formal model of the Chapter 3 is constructed to analyse the strategies and outcomes of one                                     
isolated instance of intra­party policy setting and electoral response to such, each round of the                             
experiment constitutes a single one­shot game, the outcomes of which have no direct bearing on the                               
experimental procedures of the subsequent rounds. To enforce conformity of the experimental setting                         
with this design feature, the group leader and the voter players were instructed to take into account                                 
solely the information that is relevant for the present round while weighing their options. At the start of                                   
the round, the voters were being randomly assigned into Red and Black types (i.e. Reformist­ and                               
Conservative­type voters), while the group leaders were setting the official party A policy. The                           
policy­setting deliberation was completed ‘behind the closed doors’: the group leaders were either                         
escorted out of the room or asked to join the experimenter to avoid being observed by the voters, which                                     
could in turn inadvertently lead voters to blame one of the group leaders for choosing a policy to their                                     
detriment . The Red group leader (in the model, the homogenous Reformist faction) made the first                             11
move by circling ‘Red’ to proposal a change of the current policy of the party (Black) or ‘Black’ to                                     
support the current policy instead on a sheet of paper provided to them. The Black group leader (that is,                                     
the Conservative faction) was then informed about the choice of the Red leader and offered to circle                                 
their preferred option (‘Red’ or ‘Black’) on a sheet of paper if the preceding choice was ‘Red’. The                                   
outcome policy point was then announced to the voters, who had to indicate their party of choice by                                   
circling ‘A’ or ‘B’ on a ballot paper . Finally, the ballots were collected, the votes were counted with                                   12




This study conforms with the principles of handling personal data set forth in the Finnish Personal Data                                 
Act (Henkilötietolaki 523/1999) and with the ethical guidelines issued by the Finnish Advisory Board                           13
on Research Integrity (2002). The principles of the autonomy of research subjects, avoiding harm and                             
11 I am grateful to Daniel Kalchev for suggesting this design feature as a means to reduce the emotional bias and increase the                                             
realism  of  the  experimental  context. 
12  The  sample  group  leader  sheets  and  ballot  papers  are  included  in  the  Appendix  7  of  this  study. 
13 The English­language overview of the provisions of the Act from the website of the Finnish Social Science Data Archive                                       
was  consulted.  
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 protecting the privacy and confidentiality of the personal information lie at the core of this laboratory                               
experiment. All participants were offered to place their signature on an informed consent form                           14
detailing the purpose of the experiment, their right to discontinue their participation in the experiment                             
at any point in time, their right to privacy and the contact information of the experimenter. The                                 
anonymity of participants was ensured, and the personal information recorded in consent forms was                           
properly  coded  and  stored. 
 
24 undergraduate students at the University of Tampere and the Tampere University of Technology                           
were invited at random and recruited to participate in the experiment. Four 1­hour sessions were                             
organised. Each participant was paid a €5 compensation in cash for attending the experiment                           
immediately upon signing a consent form provided to them. At the end of each session, two                               
participants were selected at random and paid their earnings of up to €10 in cash for a randomly picked                                     
round .  The  hypothetical  earnings  for  the  round  were  calculated  according  to  the  following  formula: 15
€10 ­ ( the distance between the ideal point of the player (Red or Black) and the winning point on the                                       
policy  scale ).  
The random selection of the first winner was performed by drawing a card from a 6­card deck, where                                   
the number of the card corresponded to the number of the winning participant; the second winner was                                 
chosen similarly, with the previously picked card removed without replacement. The determination of                         




This section is organised in the following fashion: first, the data developed from the experimental                             
materials is discussed; second, the descriptive statistics are placed in the spotlight; third, the treatment                             







The analysis of this Chapter takes advantage of the group­level data on the policy distance difference                               
and probability treatment levels, the decisions of the group leaders and the winning party that was                               
gauged in the experiment. In light of significant financial and time limitations, I decided against                             
including the individual­level data in the investigation presented in the next subsection. In order to                             
ensure that the participants are focused mainly on the decision­making outcomes and the calculation of                             
their earnings by assessing the policy scale, they were not instructed to keep track of their individual                                 
strategic choices. The data input was carried out after the completion of the four experimental sessions                               
on the basis of the information from the tables of results used by the participants. Each observation                                 
contains the information on the treatments and outcomes for one round of a given session. Thus, the                                 











One of the first contentious issues that I would like to point out is that the decision to take a reformed                                         
party policy to the election was made in the majority of 11 out of 12 (91%) of cases only under the ‘ p =                                             
0.6, x ­ y > 0 ’ treatment combination, while in the other three treatment combinations the status quo                                   
policy was the prevalent choice of the group leaders. The policy of the party A was also reformed in                                     
41% (5 out of 12) of cases in the ‘ p = 0.6, x ­ y < 0 ’ pair of treatments. These two pieces of                                               
information appear to indicate that while the positive policy distance difference has a higher prevalence                             
of reformed policy, a  p = 0.6 induces the group leaders to select Reform more frequently than the                                   
model implies. In fact, the Hypothesis 1 states that the intra­party bargaining under  x ­ y < 0 should                                     
always result in the preservation of status quo policy, regardless of the value assumed by  p . Figure 4,                                   







The bar charts in Figure 4 give a clear indication concerning the party­related outcomes. The party B                                 
emerges as the winner of the election only under the  x ­ y > 0 treatment, and the majority of cases                                         
where this happened coincided with the choice of Status quo policy by the group leaders. This seems to                                   
be consistent with the Hypothesis 2.2, according to which the lower values of  p  contribute to the                                 
increased likelihood of Status quo policy being chosen by the leaders and rejected by the voters. The                                 
support for the Hypothesis 1 is quite strong, as there are no cases where the party B was chosen in the                                         
left­side half of the figure (i.e., under the  x ­ y < 0 treatment). However, the fact that in slightly over                                         
20% of cases under the ‘ p = 0.6, x ­ y < 0 ’ arrangement at least a pivotal minority of voters opted for                                             
the party B after the leaders chose to reform the party A’s policy is counterintuitive and contradicts the                                   
theory. In this case and under the logic of the Hypotheses 2.1­2.3, the party A should have secured the                                     
majority of votes. Still, the trend in the two right­hand charts generally matches the predictions of the                                 





To confirm whether the treatment (either the policy distance difference or the probability that the                             
Reformist­type voters are the majority of the party A’s electorate) had an impact on the choices made                                 
by the group leaders and the voters in the experiment, the sample mean values of the outcome variables                                   
have to be compared between the two levels of each independent variable. Since there are only two                                 
groups per one comparison, the two­sample  t ­test is the appropriate technique to employ. It allows for                               
the statistical significance of the measurements in question to be verified. The evidence discussed in                             
the previous section points to the lack of uniformity in outcomes. It is reasonable to assume variances                                 
of the two samples of an outcome mean to be unequal, which is why Welch’s generalisation of the                                   






The examination of the contents of the table paints a somewhat mixed picture about the treatment                               
effects. Policy distance difference was coded as ‘ x ­ y < 0 ’ when equal to 0 and as ‘ x ­ y > 0’  when                                               
equal to 1. First, the difference between the means of winning party, sorted by whether the policy                                 
distance difference was less than or greater than zero, is negative and statistically significant (p  < .01).                                 
That is, the null hypothesis that the means of the two samples are equal is rejected. In the coding of the                                         
‘Winning Party’ variable, 0 means ‘Party A’ and 1 is understood as ‘Party B’. Since ‘Party A’ is the                                     
baseline category, this result indicates that the change from ‘ x ­ y < 0’ to ‘ x ­ y > 0’  under ‘p = 0.4’                                               
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 appears to increase the propensity of voters to defect to the opposition party. The same could be stated                                   
about the change in the level of the policy distance difference variable under ‘ p = 0.6’  if the confidence                                     
interval was narrowed to 90%: in that case, the difference between the means would have been                               
negative and significant at p = .082. The ‘Leaders’ Decision’ variable, coded as ‘Black’ (the status quo                                 
policy) when equal to 0 and as ‘Red’ (the reformed policy) when equal to 1, does not vary across the                                       
levels of the policy distance difference variable when  ‘p = 0.4’ is administered. However, its mean                               
value for ‘ x ­ y < 0’ is 0.5 less than for ‘ x ­ y > 0’  when  p was set at  0.6 , which is a statistically                                                     
significant estimate (p < .01) implying that with  ‘p = 0.6’ the intra­party bargaining leads to the                                 
adoption of a reformed policy more often when moving from negative to positive policy distance                             
difference. All in all, when the  p  variable is kept at the same level, the estimates in the upper part of the                                           
table lend support to the reasoning that the theoretical model outlined for the direction of causality                               
between  the  policy  distance  difference  and  the  decision­making  outcomes. 
 
This conclusion can be extended to the estimates in the lower part of the table as well. Probability was                                     
coded as  ‘p = 0.4’ when equal to 0 and as  ‘p = 0.6’  when equal to 1. The means of the winning party                                               
sorted by the level of  p are equal at ‘ x ­ y < 0’ and positive (0.33) at ‘ x ­ y > 0’ , hinting at an increased                                                     
frequency of party A winning under  ‘p = 0.4’  than at  ‘p = 0.6’. It must be noted that the significance of                                           
the latter would be rather weak at p = .105 even with a confidence interval of 90%. The negative                                     
means difference of the leaders’ decision (­0.33) would have beens statistically significant with a                           
narrowed confidence interval of 90% at p = .066. In turn, this would inject credibility into the                                 
following statement contradicting the prediction of the Hypothesis 1: ‘under the fixed ‘ x ­ y < 0’                                 
treatment the outcome of the intra­party bargaining is more likely to be a reformed official policy of the                                   
party A as  p moves from  0.4 to  0.6 ’. The ‘Leaders’ Decision’ means difference is negative at ­0.83 and                                     
highly significant (p < .001) for the  ‘p = 0.4’  to  ‘p = 0.6’ comparison and ‘ x ­ y > 0’ . That is, the                                               
choice of the factions in this setting favoured a reformed policy at  ‘p = 0.6’  a lot more often than at  ‘p                                           
= 0.4’ . To some extent, these findings can be said to match the pattern described in the Hypothesis 1:                                     
the higher level of  p clearly motivates factions to opt for the policy reform and reduces the incidence of                                     
a  party  B  victory. 
 
Due to the weak statistical significance levels of some of the results discussed above, these conclusions                               
have to be treated with care. The small sample size could be the main reason behind the presence of                                     
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 non­significant estimates. Thus, it is important to admit the uncertainty of whether increasing the                           




What if the treatments were only effective or absent due to the particular order, in which they were                                   
received by the participants? Table 8 contains the information resulting from the comparison of the                             
means of the two outcome variables sorted by the treatment order (where 0 means the participants were                                 
treated with  x ­ y < 0 in rounds 1­6 and 1 ­ in rounds 7­12) and arranged by the treatment combination.                                           
This  material  is  sufficient  to  confirm  or  deny  the  interference  of  order  effects. 
 




The simple answer to the question posed in this section is that the mean values of the winning party and                                       
the leaders’ decision variables vary between the two treatment orders (with the notable exception of the                               
two cases where the means of the winning party variable are equal), yet these differences have no                                 
statistical significance. Since the sample contains only 48 observations, it is hard to state with absolute                               
certainty that the difference would remain non­significant with a sufficiently increased sample size.                         
The isolated case of the sample explored in the experiment appears to indicate that the differences in                                 
outcomes across the two orders of treatment provision are relatively small and do not interfere with the                                 
treatment effects. They might have been caused by the technical errors on part of the participants, who                                 





In this section, I make an attempt at a more rigorous examination of the links between the explanatory                                   
variables and the leaders’ decision outcome variable by employing the logistic regression (logit). This                           
nonlinear statistical model is applied in the analysis of data on binomial outcomes and assumes a logit                                 
distribution for the outcome variable instead of a normal distribution (as is the case with the ordinary                                 
least squares model) (Long and Freese 2001, 102). The logit views the relationship of the explanatory                               
and the outcome variables as non­linear. The leaders’ decision outcome variable is dichotomous since                           
the values it assumes are 0 and 1, which is why this model is suitable for the purposes of this                                       
investigation. Primarily, I seek to obtain the measurement of the effect that each of the explanatory                               
variables has on the probability that leaders’ decision equals to 1 (i.e., that the group leaders chose to                                   
reform  the  party  A’s  policy).  The  formal  notation  of  the  model  is 
(Y 1 ∣ X , X )  F (z),  P =   1   2 =  
where  P is the probability that has to obtain,  Y is leaders’ decision, is policy distance difference and                         X1          
is the probability of a Reformist voter majority. It has a logistic distribution denoted by the functionX2                                    
F(z)  of  a  linear  function  of  the  explanatory  variables 
  β X   β X ,z = β0 +   1 1 +   2 2  
where through are the log­odds parameters indicating the effect of the explanatory variables on  β0     β2                          
the probability that  Y = 1. The values of the parameters are obtained using maximum likelihood (ML)                                 
estimation method and are not as readily interpretable, as would have been the case in a linear model                                   
with a continuous outcome. In Long and Freese’s words (2001, 89), ‘in nonlinear models the effect of a                                   
change in a variable depends on the values of all variables in the model and is no longer simply equal                                       
to one of the parameters of the model’. This is precisely why it would be both interesting and necessary                                     
to determine the precise amount of the impact that a discrete change of the explanatory variable from 0                                   
to 1 has on the predicted probability of  Y = 1. The form of the estimate in question, adopted from Long                                         
(1997,  78),  is  given  below 
  (Y  ∣ X , X 1) − P (Y  ∣ X , X ).∆X1
∆P (Y  = 1 ∣ X )2 = P = 1 2   1 =   = 1 2   1 = 0  
The term on the left­hand side of the equation is the discrete change in the predicted probability of  Y =                                       
1  caused by a one­unit discrete change from 0 to 1 in the value of , with the other explanatory                              X1          
variable, , held constant at its mean. This equation can easily be rewritten for the estimation of the  X2                                  
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 discrete change in . The estimates that were generated by means of running the model are set forth      X2                              
in  Table  9. 
 




The first indicator to consider is the one providing the measure of how well the model fits the data. The                                       
likelihood ratio (LR) test is used to this end (Long 1997, 96), where the null hypothesis that the effects                                     
of the policy distance difference and the probability independent variables alike (which is reflected in                             
the coefficients) are equal to 0 is rejected with a p­value of less than .001. This leaves no doubt about                                       
the appropriateness of the model for the analysis of this data. Both of the ML coefficients are                                 
significant, with the effect of policy distance difference (1.89 with  z =  2.09 at p < .05) on the outcome                                       
variable being clearly weaker and less statistically significant than that of probability (3.59 with  z =                               
3.58 at p < .001). The estimates of the discrete change in the probability of the outcome variable being                                     
equal to 1 are the key to understanding the results reported in Table 9 correctly. The reformed party A’s                                     
policy is 0.37 more likely to be the outcome of the intra­party process if policy distance difference is                                   
positive than when it is negative, holding the probability variable constant at its mean. This outcome is                                 
also 0.64 more likely to emerge when the probability is 0.6 than when it is 0.4, holding policy distance                                     
difference constant. In general, the Hypothesis 2.1 is reflected in the values of the discrete change, as                                 
the likelihood of the status quo policy being kept appears to be reduced by the influence of both                                   
explanatory variables: paraphrasing this, the group leaders in the experiment were indeed more likely                           
to reform their party’s policy when  R was set to be closer to  B than to  C , and  p = 0.6 . Conversely, these                                             
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It is safe to say that the findings of the laboratory experiment establish a body of evidence that is either                                       
partially or fully supportive of the theoretical insights into the outcomes of intra­party bargaining on                             





Note: the upward­looking arrow indicates that the increase in the corresponding term is                         
required; the downward­looking arrow indicates the required reduction in the corresponding                     
term;  the  lack  of  arrow  indicates  that  such  trend  is  irrelevant. 
 
The winning party element of the first outcome combination is indeed valid and is generated under the                                 
influence of the negative policy distance difference, as the descriptive and causal analyses of the                             
previous section suggest. The detected effect of the negative policy distance treatment on the policy                             
element of this outcome was in tune with the theory and significant, but the fact that the policy was                                     
reformed in slightly less than a half of observations for the treatment combining  p = 0.6  and  x ­ y < 0                                           
raises an important concern as to what caused this heterogeneity to arise. The support for the second                                 
outcome is more clear­cut. Descriptively, the 0.6 (higher) chance of the Reform­type majority in the                             
party’s voter base that should improve the likelihood of the probabilistic condition being met coincides                             
with a high rate of party A victories when the policy reform is chosen by the leaders. The analysis of                                       
treatment effects indicates that  x ­ y > 0  induces the group leaders to agree on Reform more frequently.                                     
Furthermore, positive policy distance difference and 0.6 probability were found to significantly                       
increase the incidence of the reformed party policy. There are some outlier cases where the opposition                               
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 party beats the incumbent party with a reformed policy, but these do not distort the discovered causal                                 
links significantly. The third setting manifests itself quite prominently in all analyses that were                           
performed, as  x ­ y > 0 and a lower (0.4) probability have led to a status quo policy preservation with                                         
both  incumbent  and  opposition  party  victories  in  a  sufficient  number  of  cases. 
 
As I mentioned earlier, some heterogeneity that was not predicted by the theory is present in the                                 
outcomes and visible in the descriptive analysis. The order effects were not discovered, but I found the                                 
variance of results across the two orders of treatment provision to be nonzero, albeit non­significant. It                               
might have been interesting to investigate the treatment and order effects as sorted by the number of                                 
session, but the sample size would have made such analysis invalid by limiting the number of                               
observations per treatment combination for each session available to just 3. The number of                           
observations in the sample is a key concern, as the analysis forces me to suspect that a larger sample                                     
could  have  yielded  estimates  that  are  different  from  the  ones  discussed  in  this  Chapter. 
 
On the whole, I found substantial empirical grounds to argue that the behaviour of factions and voters                                 
of a political party leads to the electoral and policy consequences that are influenced by their                               
knowledge of electoral uncertainty and the ideological divisions, along which the party and its                           
electorate are split. Additional experimentation is required to examine the strategic behaviour on the                           




I would like to remind the reader that the inquiry that evolved into the present thesis has its roots in the                                         
casual observations about the functioning of political parties that I have been making myself for a                               
while. The crises that sometimes shake up the very foundation of parties are doubtlessly spectacular                             
happenings, often surrounded by controversy, public feuds between different groups of party members,                         
chaos and the divorce with splinter groups. Some of these situations arise in dire electoral                             
circumstances, yet in other cases fierce infighting have broken out under generally normal conditions.                           
Such incidents strip the internal life of parties completely bare of its covers and tend to reveal the                                   
identities of the factions and their leaders as well as their stances on the policy issues of the day.                                     
Beyond the turbulence of critical moments, these divisions remain concealed from the public eye                           
behind the closed doors of the party room. The set of conditions that keeps political parties successful                                 
and their policies stable and the dramatic failure of these that often coincides with electoral downturns                               
is  the  fascinating  riddle  that  this  thesis  aimed  to  disentangle. 
 
The theoretical grounding . Thus, the ultimate purpose of the study was to arrive at a credible                               
explanation of the intra­party process by considering the influential factors and the main actors that                             
affect its structure and shape its outcomes. The overarching question that I asked in the introduction                               
was: ‘ Does a relationship exist between the intra­party policy­setting bargaining of factions and the                           
response to such by the voters who supported the party at the previous election? ’. First of all, the                                   
scholarship in political science seems to converge on the positive answer to this question: the theories                               
of intra­party bargaining normally tie within­party fragmentation to the electoral results. While voters                         
are at times included in the individual behaviour­based game­theoretical models as actors in their own                             
right, this is not the case in the studies that apply the concept of factionalism to explain the collective                                     
aspect of intra­party divisions. Therefore, as the extant research, on the one hand, acknowledges the                             
importance of voters (Mershon and Shvetsova 2013) and, on the other hand, homogenous factions that                             
act as a single individual with clearly defined policy preferences (Ceron 2012), I concluded that                             
combining these two ways of thinking into the central direction of this thesis was a theoretically sound                                 
approach  to  adopt  that  also  happened  to  make  perfect  intuitive  sense. 
 
The structure of intra­party bargaining with electoral response . Developing a logically consistent                       
formal model of intra­party bargaining with voter participation that would bind together the intuitive                           
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 reasoning that stems from the casual case­based narrative and the assumptions justified with the prior                             
scientific knowledge encompassed the next stage of this inquiry. In order to meet this challenge, I                               
sought to obtain the explanation for the first complementary question: ‘ What is the structure and the                               
primary mechanism of such a relationship? ’. To clarify the structural composition of the relationship, I                             
set out to construct a one­shot sequential extensive form game of intra­party bargaining with imperfect                             
information on the policy preference distribution in the electorate that is common to all actors. The                               
parties were to contest elections in a perfect two­party political system. This game describes how the                               
two equal­sized factions of a governing party with differing viewpoints on an abstract issue determine                             
the official position of their party that is then announced to the voters, some of whom voted for the                                     
governing party in the previous election and are aligned with either of the factions on the issue. The                                   
voters, unaware of whether the policy decision was unanimous or not, have to choose whether to                               
support  the  party  again  or  vote  for  the  opposition  party  instead.  
 
The mechanism of the relationship . Consequently, the backward induction of the model paved the                           
way for the Nash equilibria solutions to be found for the game. The three factors driving the                                 
mechanism of the relationship between the factions and the voters were revealed to be 1) the difference                                 
between the distances that separate the policy points of the Conservative faction and voters ( C ), the                               
Reformist faction and voters ( R ) and the opposition party ( B ) on a one­dimensional policy scale, 2) the                                 
probability of a Reformist­minded voter type majority in the electoral base of the incumbent party and                               
3) the probability that the Reformist voter minority will defect to the opposition if the factions do not                                   
agree to make their preferred policy official. A list of multiple equilibria that exist under relaxed                               
constraints is reduced to the following few strategy profiles by restricting the boundaries of                           
probabilities and disregarding the case of equidistance between the policy points in keeping with the                             
intuition about the real­life politics. When constrained only by the negative difference between the                           
distances, the factions were predicted to preserve the status quo official policy for their party due to                                 
steadfast opposition of the Conservative faction to the policy reform, while the voters of both types                               
would find it optimal (i.e. beneficial) to support the party. The factions would strictly unanimously                             
choose to reform the party policy to win over the complete backing of their party’s voter base only                                   
under a positive difference between distances given that the policy considerations outweigh the                         
electoral uncertainty considerations in their minds as well as in the minds of the voters. This                               
equilibrium is fragile and may either coexist with two other equilibria under the positive distance                             
78 
 difference constraint or fail to satisfy at least one of the two constraints on its optimality. The remaining                                   
optimal behavioural sequences are for the factions to strictly end up securing the old policy position of                                 
the party (unanimously or not), whereby the Reformist voters would always respond with defection and                             
the Conservative voters would remain loyal to the incumbent party. These two cases become possible                             
when the voter and the factions see the electoral uncertainty as more important than the policy                               
divisions. To evaluate the balance between the uncertainty and the policy, the actors have to make a                                 
detailed comparison of the two probability variables known to them and the policy distances on the                               
scale. 
 
The outcomes . In order to answer the second complementary subquestion of the study, ‘ What are the                               
key determinants of the outcomes of this relationship and how does their influence manifest itself? ’, I                               
reformulated the Nash equilibrium strategy profiles that were derived from the model by means of                             
conducting a backward induction on it. These were presented as the Hypotheses 1 through 2.3 in the                                 
discussion section of the Chapter 3 and tested by means of carrying out a laboratory experiment, the                                 
findings from which were examined statistically in the Chapter 4. For the purposes of the experimental                               
evaluation of the theory, it was useful and correct to identify two separate kinds of outcomes, namely a)                                   
the policy outcome of the factionalist bargaining (the reformed or the status quo policy) and b) the                                 
winning party chosen by the electorate (the incumbent or the opposition party). The outcomes and their                               
determinants were also divided into three groups. 1. Given the negative policy distance difference and                             
regardless of the probabilities, the governing party was predicted to win the election on an unchanged                               
policy with certainty. 2. Where the policy distance difference is positive, the incumbent party would                             
certainly prevail in the election with a reformed policy with policy element worrying the factions and                               
the voters more than the probabilities. 3. Conversely, if the uncertainty was to be seen as a greater                                   
headache for the factions and the voters alike, the policy­setting game between factions would always                             
result in the current policy preservation with the winning party remaining unclear depending on the                             
exact  size  of  the  dissatisfied  Reformist  voter  minority. 
 
The experimental findings . Crucially, the evaluation of the proposed hypotheses employed                     
randomisation and random sampling to ensure that the unobservable personal characteristics of                       
individual participants did not bias the procedural outcomes. The procedures were constructed so that                           
to replicate the decision tree of the formal model in the most precise fashion. The random assignment                                 
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 of participants to play the factions or the voters of either type preceded the administering of the two                                   
experimental treatments, the policy distance difference and the probability of the Reformist voter                         
majority. Both had two levels, one of which was used as the baseline for statistical inference. The                                 
number of one­shot games was set at 12 in order to maximise the number of observations in the                                   
sample. The analysis of the data from the laboratory experiment generated a body of evidence that can                                 
be considered as largely favourable to the theoretical narrative that underpinned the experimental                         
design. With the exception of the policy segment of the outcome combination 1 that was found to have                                   
a significant heterogeneity, the equilibrium causal relationship of the determinants and the outcomes                         
materialised in the experimental analysis. Where the Reformist policy was situated closer to the                           
Conservative policy than to the opposition party’s policy, the incumbent party was the sole winner in                               
all observed cases. The choice of the status quo was more likely under a positive policy distance                                 
difference and a lower level of probability and led to the victory for the opposition party more often.                                   
Alternatively, the victory of the governing party with a reformed policy was more likely under a                               
positive distance difference and a higher probability level. However small, the presence of cases where                             
the reformed policy was matched by the opposition party’s victory is clearly abnormal. This, and the                               
reformed policy outcome under a negative policy distance difference and a higher level of probability                             
may be explained by the weak grasp of instructions leading to the incorrect behaviour of participants or                                 
simply by the small sample size that could have exaggerated the abnormalities of the outcomes                             
decreased the significance of the treatment effects observed. The possibility that the order of the                             
treatment provision distorted the outcomes was rejected with only nonsignificant descriptive evidence                       
pointing  in  its  direction. 
 
The added value of the research . Now that I have completed the summary of the results, the valid                                   
question to dwell upon is the one about the added value of this study. First and foremost, by developing                                     
the theoretical model encompassing factionalism, voting behaviour and electoral uncertainty is unique                       
and represents a step forward on the path that was defined by the previous research on intra­party                                 
bargaining. Moreover, the choice of the method of empirical evaluation that was implemented to                           
evaluate the model is novel, as none of the earlier inquiries that aimed to come up with an                                   
evidence­based general theory of intra­party politics have done so. This thesis allows for compelling                           
statements to be made about the intra­party bargaining. By putting the voters at the forefront, my model                                 
acknowledges the degree, to which the factional behaviour is beholden to the electoral factors. The key                               
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 insight of this study is that the factions of political parties are not only mindful of the the voters and                                       
their preferences in their reactions to a particularly defined field of preferences, but could also alter                               
their positions to be able to exert leverage in intra­party negotiations. Being in and of itself a starting                                   
point for a larger research project, my thesis opens a window of opportunity for a new direction of                                   
inquiry  into  the  determinants  and  characteristics  of  intra­party  politics. 
 
The limitations of the study and the future improvements . Clearly, more can be accomplished in the                               
future by tackling a number of limitations that are inherent to a kind of initial and simplified analysis                                   
that my thesis embodies. The assumptions about the behaviour of the factions and the voters that were                                 
placed in the foundation of the model could be ­ and certainly need to be, ­ relaxed to increase the                                       
ecological validity of the theory. For instance, the model could be improved by allowing the voters to                                 
simply sit the election out. The fact that voter abstention is an immense problem in all democracies                                 
creates a major concern for the validity of my theory, and introducing this strategic option could alter                                 
the predicted behaviour of the actors profoundly. The setting of the model is an issue: as few                                 
contemporary political systems bear close resemblance to the stylised case, in which my model is                             
framed, the institutional complexity could be increased by contrasting between various types of                         
electoral constraints, allowing for minor parties to exist and addressing the differences in the specific                             
packages of legislative rules in unicameral and bicameral parliaments. Furthermore, other intra­party                       
rules could be incorporated into the extension to the model by departing from the unanimity and                               
viewing factions as entities that are roughly equal in strength. Finally, the convenience and simplicity                             
of the one­dimensional policy space could be replaced by a more realistic version that accounts for two                                 
policy dimensions. Even though the empirical section of this thesis delivers credible proof of the model                               
predictions, the question marks hanging over certain portions of the experimental data speak for                           
themselves. Any future experiment based on my model would have to take advantage of a more                               
numerous group of participants if it is to allow for truly rigorous statistical tests to be conducted. In                                   
addition, I hope to be able to focus the next experiment not only on the group­level decision­making                                 
outcomes, but also on supporting or refuting the theoretical predictions with respect to the                           
individual­level strategies of the voters and factions. Alternative venues of empirical evaluation could                         
be explored, such as the observational study with a cross­country data on political parties, their factions                               
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(SQ,  D,  S)  (1 ) , x  q2 − p ≥
y
x+y   ≥ y











You are randomly assigned to play as the Black group leader.  Keep in mind that all types of interaction                                     
with  other  participants  are  prohibited. 
  
There are two parties, A and B. All of the participants are going to play for the party A, while the party                                           
B is hypothetical. Party A is divided into two groups, headed by Red and Black group leaders with Red                                     
and Black as their preferred points respectively. There are 4 voters of the party A randomly assigned                                 




Red and Black group leaders leave the room to decide whether to keep party A’s current policy, Black,                                   
or change it to Red. Black is replaced by Red only when Red group leader proposes the change and                                     
Black group leader supports it. When leaders return to the room,  leaders’ decision – the official policy                                 




The Red, Black and party B’s policy points are marked on a line shown on the screen. The location of                                       
the Red point on the line will be changed in the beginning of rounds #1 and #7. If your preferred point                                         
is the winning point, your earnings are  a maximum of €10 . If a different point is chosen, your earnings                                     
are €10 minus the amount equal to absolute distance between your point and the winning point.  At the                                   




In the beginning of each round, voters will be randomly assigned Red or Black as their preferred point                                   
by means of drawing a card of either colour from a 10­card deck. Results of each draw are not                                     
announced publicly and are known only to the participant and the assistant, to whom he/she returns the                                 





 After voters are assigned Red or Black as their preferred point, group leaders leave the room to make                                   
their decision. The Red group leader gets to move first. If their choice is Red, you can support this                                     
decision or veto it by voting for current policy. If they choose Black, it remains party A’s official                                   
policy.  Policy change happens only if both party leaders agree to it. You cannot offer to change                                 






























 Don’t forget to calculate your earnings per round! Your                 











You are randomly assigned to play as the Red group leader.  Keep in mind that all types of interaction with other participants                                           
are  prohibited. 
  
There are two parties, A and B. All of the participants are going to play for the party A, while the party B is hypothetical.                                                 
Party A is divided into two groups, headed by Red and Black group leaders with Red and Black as their preferred points                                           




Red and Black group leaders leave the room to decide whether to keep party A’s current policy, Black, or change it to Red.                                             
Black is replaced by Red only when Red group leader proposes the change and Black group leader supports it. When                                       
leaders return to the room,  leaders’ decision – the official policy point of the party A ­ is announced to the voters. Voters                                             




The Red, Black and party B’s policy points are marked on a line shown on the screen. The location of the Red point on the                                                 
line will be changed in the beginning of rounds #1 and #7. If your preferred point is the winning point, your earnings are  a                                               
maximum of €10 . If a different point is chosen, your earnings are €10 minus the amount equal to absolute distance between                                         




In the beginning of each round, voters will be randomly assigned Red or Black as their preferred point by means of drawing                                           
a card of either colour from a 10­card deck. Results of each draw are not announced publicly and are known only to the                                             




After voters are assigned Red or Black as their preferred point, group leaders leave the room to make their decision. Please                                         
write “Red” to propose a policy change or “Black” to support the current policy on the sheet of paper provided to you. Then                                             
pass the paper to the assistant. If you choose to change the policy, Black group leader can support your decision or veto it by                                               
choosing Black.  Policy change happens only if both party leaders agree to it. If you choose Black, it remains party A’s                                         

































Don’t forget to calculate your earnings per round! Your                 











You are randomly assigned to play as a voter.  Keep in mind that all types of interaction with other                                     
participants  are  prohibited. 
  
There are two parties, A and B. All of the participants are going to play for the party A, while the party                                           
B is hypothetical. Party A is divided into two groups, headed by Red and Black group leaders with Red                                     
and Black as their preferred points respectively. There are 4 voters of the party A randomly assigned                                 




Red and Black group leaders leave the room to decide whether to keep party A’s current policy, Black,                                   
or change it to Red. Black is replaced by Red only when Red group leader proposes the change and                                     
Black group leader supports it. When leaders return to the room,  leaders’ decision – the official policy                                 




The Red, Black and party B’s policy points are marked on a line shown on the screen. The location of                                       
the Red point on the line will be changed in the beginning of rounds #1 and #7. If your preferred point                                         
is the winning point, your earnings are  a maximum of €10 . If a different point is chosen, your earnings                                     
are €10 minus the amount equal to absolute distance between your point and the winning point.  At the                                   




In the beginning of each round, voters will be randomly assigned Red or Black as their preferred point                                   
by means of drawing a card of either colour from a 10­card deck. Results of each draw are not                                     
announced publicly and are known only to the participant and the assistant, to whom he/she returns the                                 





 You will have to return the card you have drawn to the assistant and mark its colour in the “My voter                                         
colour” row of the table for the current round.  Once the party A policy point decided by the group                                     




































 Don’t forget to calculate your earnings per round! Your                 































 Write your answers in the spaces provided. You can find the answers on the reverse side of this                                   































































The purpose of this experiment is to examine within­group decision making and voter response to its                               
outcomes. 
 
The experiment consists of one 12­round session, during which you will be asked to play  a game                                 
modelling  the  above­described  relationship.  At  the  end,  you  will  be  paid  small  monetary  rewards. 




The following data will be recorded: card draw results, player choices and individual earnings per                             
round. 
 








Your signature below indicates that you have understood the information about the current experiment                           
and consent to your participation. The participation is voluntary and you may refuse to answer certain                               
questions on the questionnaire and withdraw from the study at any time with no penalty. This does not                                   
110 














SESSION – a numerical variable indicating the number of the session according to the temporal order,                               





ID – a string variable storing identification numbers of participants. Roman numerals I, II, III (and IV)                                 
stand for the number of the session, in which the participant took part; Arabic numerals stand for the                                   
number  that  the  participant  had  during  the  session. 
  







P – a binary variable indicating the probability that voter participants will have ‘Red’ as their preferred                                 
colour (the number of Red cards in the 10­card deck, changes after round 0 and then after every 3                                     
rounds).  0  is  ‘0.4’,  1  is  ‘0.6’ 
  
LEADERDECISION – a binary variable indicating the official policy point of the party A as decided                               
by  the  group  leaders  for  each  round.  0  is  ‘Black’,  1  is  ‘Red’. 
  




 TREATMENT – a categorical variable indicating the treatment combination. 1 is ’ p = 0.4, x – y < 0 ’, 2                                       
is  ‘p  =  0.4,  x  –  y  >  0 ’,  3  is  ‘p  =  0.6,  x  –  y  <  0 ’,  4  is  ‘p  =  0.6,  x  –  y  >  0 ’. 
  
TORDER – a binary variable indicating the order of treatment provision. 0 is ‘ x – y < 0 first ’, 1 is ‘ x –                                             
y  <  0  last ’. 
  
RED ­ a continuous numerical variable indicating the probability that voter participants who drew a                             
Red card will vote for the party B if the group leaders’ decision is not ‘Red’ (based on the number of                                         
voter  participants  who  picked  a  Red  card  for  the  round). 
  
EARNINGS  –  a  numerical  variable  indicating  the  amount  earned  by  a  participant  per  round  (€).   
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